Fordham Law Review
Volume 71

Issue 4

Article 15

2003

Taking Stock: The Need To Amend 28 U.S.C. § 455 To Achieve
Clarity and Sensibility in Disqualification Rules for Judges'
Financial Holdings
Ziona Hochbaum

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ziona Hochbaum, Taking Stock: The Need To Amend 28 U.S.C. § 455 To Achieve Clarity and Sensibility in
Disqualification Rules for Judges' Financial Holdings, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1669 (2003).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol71/iss4/15

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

NOTE
TAKING STOCK: THE NEED TO AMEND 28
U.S.C. § 455 TO ACHIEVE CLARITY AND
SENSIBILITY IN DISQUALIFICATION RULES
FOR JUDGES' FINANCIAL HOLDINGS
Ziona Hochbaum*
"And yet the fate of all extremes is such, /Men may be read, as well
as books, too much. /To observations which ourselves we make, /
We grow more partial for th' observer's sake."1
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenarios:
Judge A owns ten shares in W Corporation, which is a named party
in a case on her docket. Judge B owns ten shares in X Corporation,
which is a putative member2 of the plaintiff class in a class action
pending before her. Judge C owns ten shares in Y Corporation, which
is an absent member3 of the certified plaintiff class in a class action
pending before her. Judge D owns ten shares in Z Corporation,
making her a putative member of the plaintiff class in a class action
she is assigned to hear.
Under the current 28 U.S.C. § 455, the statute governing
disqualification and recusal of federal judges,4 Judge A would have to
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law. My thanks to Professor
Bruce A. Green for his valuable guidance. Thank you also to Brian Lehman for his
help and input. And thank you most of all to my parents for their unending love, faith,
and support.
1. Alexander Pope, Epistle I to Sir Richard Temple, Lord Cobham, in Moral
Essays 4 (1751).
2. A putative class member is a potential or expected member of a class where
the class has yet to be certified. See infra Part II.A.1, 2.
3. An absent class member is any member of a certified class that is not among
the class representatives who have filed and are litigating the suit. See infra Part
II.A.1, 2.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000). The term "disqualification" traditionally has been
used to refer to the "statutorily or constitutionally mandated removal of a judge,"
occurring upon the motion of a party. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial
Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 1213, 1214 n.4
(2002). In contrast, "recusal," or "recusation," denotes a judge's "discretionary,
voluntary decision to step down." Id. In common usage, however, as well as in this
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recuse herself regardless of whether her stake in the outcome were
one million dollars or one penny.' If, however, Judge A had already
devoted "substantial judicial time" to the case when the conflict came
to her attention, and her interest did not stand to be substantially
affected by the outcome, she could divest of her shares and continue
presiding.6 In addition, some courts would permit Judge A to divest of
her interest regardless of the stage of the litigation in which it was
discovered, provided that she suspended involvement in the case until
she had sold the shares, and provided that the interest could not have
been substantially affected by the outcome.7
Judge B would face a more difficult recusal question. Her decision
would turn on whether an interest in a putative class member is
treated as an interest in a party to the proceeding, an interest in the
subject matter of the proceeding, or simply an interest that could be
affected by the outcome of the proceeding.' On this question the
statute provides no guidance and the courts have reached no
consensus.9 The consequences of defining her interest one way or
another are significant: An interest in a party or in the subject matter
of the proceeding would be automatically disqualifying,"0 although the
former could be divested under the same circumstances as Judge A's
interest." On the other hand, an interest that merely stood to be
affected by the suit would disqualify Judge B only if the potential
impact of the outcome were substantial. 2
Judge C, too, would find no answers in the statute or legislative
history. Most courts that have considered the question, however, have
held that an absent class member has the status of a party to the
proceeding. 3 If Judge C adopted this view, she would then follow the
same analysis as Judge A.
Finally, Judge D would have to decide whether her status as a
putative class member made her a party to the proceeding, in which
case she would have to recuse herself, 4 or gave her one of the other
types of interests described above, opening the door to other
possibilities.
Note, the terms are generally used interchangeably. Id.; see also Margaret Frances
Evers, Disqualificationof FederalJudges- The Need for Better Guidelines, 13 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 353, 353 n.1 (1977) (parsing the technical definitions of the terms).
5. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)).
6. See infra Part I.C.4 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 455(f)).
7. See infra Part II.A.3.
8. See infra Part II.A.2.
9. See infra Part II.A.2.
10. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)).
11. See infra Part I.C.4 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 455(f)).
12. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)).
13. See infra Part II.A.2.
14. See infra Part II.A.2.
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Although Congress passed its most recent amendment to 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 with class actions in mind,"5 the amendment left a ganglia of

unresolved questions: Is a class member considered a "party" to the
proceeding?

What about a putative class member? What happens

when the financial interest makes the judge or her family member a
class member or putative class member? At what stage of litigation is
divestiture permitted to cure the need for the judge's disqualification?
Further, from a theoretical perspective, is there any justification for
treating insubstantial financial interests as automatically disqualifying
in circumstances not covered by the amendment? These questions
arise with greater frequency-and create bigger problems-in the case
of class actions, an increasingly popular vehicle for litigation in
courtrooms across the nation.16
All judges must manage funds in one way or another.17 For many
Americans, personal money management includes some sort of
investment activity, 8 and members of the federal judiciary are
15. See H.R. Doc. No. 100-889, at 68 (1988).
As Congress recognized,
determining whether a disqualifying financial interest exists is much more difficult in
class action cases.
In complex multidistrict class action cases.., a full list of all members of a
class may not become available until long after litigation has commenced,
and a judge will be unable to determine whether a cognizable interest exists
until then. When that happens now, the case must be assigned to a different
judge, an event which disrupts the efficient administration of the case and
can be very costly to litigants.
Id. To address this problem, Congress added a new subsection to the judicial
disqualification statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(f) (2000). Subsection (f) provides that in
cases where an otherwise disqualifying "financial interest in a party" is discovered
"after substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter," a judge or her spouse
or minor child may resolve the conflict by divesting of the interest creating the
conflict. See id.
16. In 2001, a record 327 federal securities class action suits were filed, marking a
sixty percent increase over the previous year. J.H., Consumers Insist, Despite More
Suits, Litigation Curbs Still Harm Investors, Securities Week, Apr. 15, 2002, at 9.
Antitrust cases are also frequently styled as class actions. See 3 Herbert Newberg &
Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 18.01 (3d ed. 1992); see also American Bar
Association Section of Antitrust Law: Report to the House of Delegates on Judicial
Recusal, 55 Antitrust L.J. 655, 655 (1986) (noting that the problem of automatic
disqualification of judges having only a "de minimis financial interest in the outcome"
of a suit arises often in antitrust cases); Diane C. Boniface, Note, Class Actions:
Establishinga More Effective JudicialDisqualificationStandard,50 Ohio St. L.J. 1291,
1291 (1989) ("The rise in popularity of the class action is one trend resulting from
society's increased interest in litigation."). For a discussion on the historical rise in
the use of class actions, see Linda Silberman, The Vicissitudes of the American Class
Action-With a Comparative Eye, 7 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 201, 203-10 (1999).
17. "Virtually every judge must save, shelter, invest, and/or retain funds, whether
they were accumulated prior to taking the bench, or simply as a matter of prudent
disposition of current income. Short of keeping money under the mattress, every
judge engages in some sort of regulated financial activity." Jeffrey M. Shaman, Steven
Lubet & James J. Alfini, Judicial Conduct and Ethics § 7.01 (3d ed. 2000).
18. The ability and ease of online investing has widened avenues for personal
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certainly no exception. 9 Nevertheless, when judges are investors,
conflicts inevitably arise.2" Although the House Judiciary Committee
once asserted that a judge is "free to invest," provided that he "invest
in companies which are not likely to become litigants in his court,"'2 at
least one commentator has pointed out the impracticality of such a
guideline in a national (or rather, international) economy. 22 Even to
the extent that a judge might limit or monitor her own investments to
reduce the potential need for disqualification, it is difficult to exercise
such control over a spouse, adult child, or other relative's portfolio. 3
The disqualification rules for financial interests must take these
realities into account.
money management. Business Center (CNBC television broadcast, Mar. 9, 2001),
transcript available at 2001 WL 22670541 (noting a fifty-three percent increase in the
number of online accounts in 2000, a jump from eleven million to nineteen million
accounts).
19. Though more pervasive today, the problem of disqualification for stock
interests is not a new one. See John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale L.J.
605, 608 (1947) (characterizing disqualification as being "much before the courts and
legislatures"); see also Cody W. Smith, Jr., Judges-Disqualification to Act Because of
Stock Interest, 22 S.C. L. Rev. 261, 262 (1970) (asserting that disqualification is a
matter of "current public interest").
20. Ironically, In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litigation-one of the seminal
cases in this area of jurisprudence and also the decision that prompted Congress to
enact subsection (f) of the recusal statute-was, on appeal to the Supreme Court,
affirmed for lack of the required six-justice quorum; four justices had to recuse
themselves because of the same type of interest held by the challenged judge's wife.
See Richard E. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and Disqualification of
Judges, § 24.6.3 n.27 (1996); see also H.R. Doc. No. 100-889, at 69 (1988) (discussing
In re Cement as the impetus for the amendment). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has
had to recuse herself so many times because of investments in corporate parties that
she has generated an acronym: OOPS ("O'Connor Owns Party Stock"). See Jeff
Bleich & Kelly Klaus, Deciding Whether to Decide: Should There Be Standards for
Recusals?, Or. St. B. Bull., Nov. 2000, at 12.
21. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 7 (1974).
22. See Harold S. Levy, Judicial Recusals, 2 Pace L. Rev. 35, 41 (1982).
How can a judge anywhere in the federal court system be "free to invest" in
the largest corporations of America when those companies are repeatedly
present in every circuit, if not district, in the country? Contrary to the
committee report's language, strict application of [28 U.S.C. § 455] means
that a judge or his family is definitely not free to invest in any of the socalled "blue chip" securities that are traditionally considered among the best
investments. If he cannot invest in his local companies and he cannot invest
in national companies, in what can he invest? I suppose real estate on the
other side of the country is a possibility.
Id. Judge Susan Getzendanner, declining to recuse after her husband had sold stock
in a class member, was slightly more sanguine: "I agree with the congressional
admonition that federal judges have an obligation to manage investments with an eye
towards minimizing recusal problems, and in this judicial district, which has many
national cases and important litigation having nationwide effect, it is not enough to
avoid ownership in local companies." In re Indus. Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 80-C-3479,
1985 WL 2869, at *6 (N.D. I11.
Sept. 24, 1985), affd, 782 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1986).
23. The holdings of family members and relatives to the third degree of
relationship can be grounds for disqualification. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), (5) (2000).
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This Note explores how a judge's stock ownership should affect her
ability to preside over any given case. Part I of this Note provides a
philosophical and historical overview of judicial disqualification law
and summarizes the current statutory scheme. This part also outlines
the relevant canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct and how they
comport with the statute. Part II explains the special problems class
actions raise in the area of judicial disqualification. Next, this part
examines the conflicting interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 455 in cases
involving financial interests and class membership, and the possibility
of divestiture as a means of curing the need for disqualification. This
part demonstrates the need to amend the statute to make it clearer
and more adaptable to the nature of these cases, and also examines
one promising proposal for reform and why it failed. Part III presents
additional reasons for amendment. Next, it looks at how courts have
dealt with other types of conflicts, such as racial and religious
interests, where disqualification is not automatic. Part III then
proposes amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 455, and explains how the new
provisions will operate and how they will affect the outcome of the
four scenarios that began this Note.
I. JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION LAW

The values of fairness and impartiality form the philosophical
bedrock of the American judicial system.24 Yet it is both understood
and expected that a judge's character and background help to shape
her decisions. Although these principles have a long legacy, the law
of judicial recusal reflects shifting conceptions of what kinds of
conflicts are problematic, and how best to balance the quest for
perfect justice with the more mundane interest of expediency. This
part explores the policy goals underlying judicial disqualification law,
and how they sometimes conflict with each other. Next, this part
provides a historical overview, tracing the development of increasingly
elaborate statutes governing judicial recusal. This part then analyzes
the current 28 U.S.C. § 455 as it applies to financial conflicts of
interest. Finally, the part discusses the relevant canons of the Code of
Judicial Conduct and how those guidelines affect judicial recusal.
A. The Policy Dialectic
At stake in judicial disqualification law are two policy goals in
24. See Cathleen M. Devlin, Disqualification of Federal Judges- Third Circuit
Orders DistrictJudge James McGirrKelly to Disqualify Himselfso as to Preserve "The
Appearance of Justice" Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, 38 Vill. L. Rev. 1219, 1219 (1993).
25. See John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 237, 237 (1987). Defining an ideal conception of justice is "ultimately
impossible but nevertheless essential." Id.
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tension with each other: an impartial judiciary 6 and the efficient
Disqualification hampers judicial
administration of justice."
efficiency by delaying the progress of a case and thereby increasing
costs. 8 The potential for judge-shopping causes particular concern.29
Judge-shopping is a litigation tactic by which a party who believes the
assigned judge will be unsympathetic to his or her position-or simply
less sympathetic than another judge in the district-moves for recusal
even where no objective basis for questioning the judge's impartiality
exists."' A party does not have the right to the judge of his or her
choosing; indeed, cases are randomly assigned in every jurisdiction.3
Nevertheless, zealous litigators seeking a judge's disqualification can
often find some morsel in her background which could form the basis
for a recusal motion. When a judge grants such a motion, the case
must be assigned to another judge unfamiliar with the litigation.
Thus, judge-shopping impairs the efficient administration of justice.
To ensure both fairness and efficiency, the law must strike a proper
balance: If it too easily allows litigants to get rid of a judge, the cost
and delay of justice increase. If it prevents litigants from disqualifying
a biased judge, the quality of justice is compromised.32
26. In fact, the appearanceof partiality is what is frequently at play in the cases.
This is because of the "catch-all" provision of 28 U.S.C. § 455. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
"Any justice, judge or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Id. This does
not represent a watered-down standard, but a stringent one. While actual bias will
usually create an appearance problem, an appearance of partiality can exist even in
the absence of actual bias. See generally Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp.,
486 U.S. 847, 859-61 (1988).
27. See Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for
Disqualificationof Federal Judges, 35 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 662, 663 (1985); Smith,
supra note 19, at 271.
28. See United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2000) ("In any event, the
unnecessary transfer of a case from one judge to another is inherently inefficient and
delays the administration of justice."); United States v. McLain, 701 F. Supp. 1544,
1556 (M.D. Fla. 1988) ("A busy district court cannot accept unwarranted recusals or
changes in judges' assignment; they place extra burdens on the other judges and waste
judicial resources." (internal citation omitted)); Bloom, supra note 27 at 664.
29. See, e.g., United States v. EI-Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. 955, 958-59 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) ("[R]ecusal motions should not be allowed to be used as 'strategic devices to
judge shop."'). Some commentators believe that judge-shopping is a sort of forumshopping within the same forum, and thus "fosters the same manipulative evils that
led the United States Supreme Court to vigorously condemn forum-shopping."
Flamm, supra note 20, § 3.5.2 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965)).
But see In re A.H.Robins Co. Prod. Liab. Litig., 602 F. Supp. 243, 245-46 (D. Kan.
1985) (holding that a court should disregard forum-shopping allegation to focus on
merits of disqualification motion under the statute).
30. See Flamm, supra note 20, § 21.2.
31. See id.; see also, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Mo. v. Missouri, 438 F. Supp.
830, 831 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
32. See Smith, supra note 19, at 271 ("[I]f disqualification of judges is too strict,
both the cost and the delay of justice increase because the case is postponed or
another judge is brought in to hear it. If disqualification is too liberal and judges with
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The concern with judicial impartiality has several bases. First, the
Constitution guarantees litigants "due process of law. '3 3 A biased
tribunal clearly contravenes the notion of due process.34 Indeed,
procedural protections, including those provided by the rules of
evidence, are of little value if the presiding judge is biased.35 In
addition, the Supreme Court has held that a biased tribunal may
violate due process in certain circumstances, particularly in criminal
cases.3 6 Second, judicial authority rests on public acceptance of courts
and judges,37 and such public acceptance rests in turn on a belief in the
impartiality and competence of those making judicial decisions.38
When that belief is shaken by revelations of conflicts of interest, the

entire judicial system suffers.39

substantial stock interests are allowed to sit, cases may, however, be decided with less
delay, but unfairly."); see also Frank, supra note 19, at 608 ("[I]f disqualification of
judges is too easy, both the cost and the delay of justice go out of bounds. If
disqualification is too hard, cases may be decided quickly, but unfairly.").
33. U.S. const. amend. XIV § 1.
34. See Flamm, supra note 20, § 2.3.1; Bassett, supra note 4, at 1218; Note,
Disqualificationof Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 736, 746
(1973) [hereinafter Disqualificationof Judges and Justices].
35. Bassett, supra note 4, at 1218-19.
36. See Flamm, supra note 20, § 2.3.1 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523
(1927)); Jeremy S. Brumbelow, Case Note, Liteky v. United States: The Extrajudicial
Source Doctrine and Its Implications for Judicial Disqualification, 48 Ark. L. Rev.
1059, 1064 (1995); Disqualification of Judges and Justices, supra note 34, at 746 &
nn.34-35.
37. See Devlin, supra note 24, at 1219 n.2; Recent Development, Mitchell v. Sirica:
The Appearance of Justice, Recusal, and the Highly Publicized Trial, 61 Va. L. Rev.
236, 250 (1975) [hereinafter The Appearance of Justice] ("The more highly publicized
a case becomes, the more important it becomes to maintain the appearance of
justice."); Disqualification of Judges and Justices, supra note 34, at 746-47 (quoting
Justice Frankfurter's observation that "courts possess 'neither the purse nor the
sword').
38. Disqualificationof Judges and Justices,supra note 34, at 747.
39. A study by the Community Rights Counsel ("CRC") released in 1999 found
that at least eight federal appellate judges had ruled on the merits in at least
seventeen federal appeals in which they had a disqualifying financial conflict of
interest. See CRC Investigative Research Report: Appellate Judges' Financial
Conflicts of Interest, www.communityrights.org/Newsroom/CRCPressReleases/
conflictsreport.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter CRC Report]. The study,
conducted by examining judges' financial disclosure forms, received considerable
media coverage, undoubtedly damaging the perception of judges in the eyes of the
American public. See, e.g., Joe Stephens, Judges Ruled on Firms in Their Portfolios,
Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1999, at Al. The judges asserted that their failure to
withdraw from the cases was due to innocent oversights. Id. The Kansas City Star
published a similar study in 1988, finding fifty-seven cases in which a district judge had
issued one or more orders despite owning party stock. See Review of Judicial
Misconduct Statutes: Oversight Hearing Before the House Judiciary Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, on the Operation of Federal Judicial
Misconduct and Recusal Statutes, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Douglas T.
Kendall, Exec. Dir. of CRC). The effects of such revelations run deep. "When the
image of the judiciary is tarnished, the moral authority of the court is critically
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On the other hand, there are good reasons for limiting
disqualification of judges. First, as a threshold matter, disqualification
is a constitutional issue "only in the most extreme of cases."4 Second,
overly frequent disqualification might have the paradoxical effect of
undermining public confidence in the judiciary by impugning the
impartiality of judges in general. 1 Finally, there are the concerns
about the cost in resources caused by judicial recusal,42 and the

potential for abuse by litigants looking to judge-shop or to merely
elongate the process in order to frustrate the opposing party. 3
B. Tracing the Statutes

The early English common law of disqualification had the
advantage of simplicity: A direct financial interest disqualified a judge
from presiding; bias, or any other type of conflict, merited no
concern.44 The guiding axiom of the day was Lord Coke's famous

admonition, with reference to cases impacting a judge's pocketbook,
that "no man shall be a judge in his own case."'" Under this approach,

a judge might be disqualified because he stood to pocket the fine
which he had to impose; or to evict a tenant from a property in which
he had an interest; or even, for a time, to gain or lose by the decision

as a taxpayer.
undermined." Devlin, supra note 24, at 1219 n.2 (quoting John P. MacKenzie). Put in
more extreme terms, "[tihe judiciary could not function as a viable institution in a
democracy if the public lost faith in the impartiality and integrity of its judges."
Bloom, supra note 27, at 663-64.
40. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986).
41. See Bloom, supra note 27, at 664.
42. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text; see also Black v. Am. Mut. Ins.
Co., 503 F. Supp. 172, 173 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (criticizing party for waiting until a few
days before trial, when intense settlement negotiations had begun, to raise
disqualification issue); id. at 174 (noting that even if delay was not the motive for
filing the motion, the opposing parties would still unfairly suffer denial of "the
reasonably prompt day in court to which they are entitled" were the motion for
recusal granted). Some courts have expressed the fear that recusal motions will
become yet another standard motion to be filed in every case. See Sollenbarger v.
Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 706 F. Supp. 776, 779 (D.N.M. 1989) (citing
additional cases).
44. Frank, supra note 19, at 609. Indeed, even when a judge was related to a
party, early English courts did not require disqualification. Bassett, supra note 4, at
1223.
45. Frank, supra note 19, at 610. The original Latin phrase is "Aliquis non debet
esse judex in propris causa." Evers, supra note 4, at 356. Blackstone shared the view
that only pocketbook-based conflicts warranted disqualification. Bassett, supra note
4, at 1223; Evers, supra note 4, at 356.
46. Frank, supra note 19, at 610. Disqualification of judges as taxpayers created
obvious difficulties-if every judge had a disqualifying interest by virtue of being a
taxpayer, who would hear the case? Id. at 611. Thus evolved the doctrine known as
the "rule of necessity," which permits a judge to sit when another conflict-free judge
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While American civil law incorporated the bar against presiding
with a financial conflict of interest, it greatly, if gradually, expanded
the concept of financial interest, thereby broadening the grounds
available for disqualifying a judge.47 Congress enacted the first
disqualification statute in 1792.48 The law required recusal "when the
judge had a financial interest in the litigation or [had] represented
either party as counsel. '49 An 1821 amendment also required recusal
when a judge's relationship to a party rendered it improper, in the
judge's own opinion, to preside over the case.5
In 1911, Congress significantly broadened the original statute by
adding a judge's "interest" in the case, prior role as counsel, status as a
material witness, or close relationship with an attorney to the list of
disqualifiers 1 At the same time, Congress passed legislation which
for the first time allowed a party to request disqualification when he
or she believed the judge had a personal bias or prejudice against him
or her. 2 In 1948, these two statutes were recodified as the current 28
U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144,'5 respectively. As part of the recodification of
cannot be had. Id.
47. The increasing elaboration in disqualification provisions with each
amendment represents a quest for a sort of uber-perfection in the judiciary. See
Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at 245. According to one commentator, "[i]ncreasing
doubts that correct answers exist for legal questions underlie the growth of
disqualification." Id. at 249.
48. Bassett, supra note 4, at 1223 (citing Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat.
278-79); see also Evers, supra note 4,at 357.
49. Bassett, supra note 4, at 1223; Evers, supra note 4, at 357.
50. Bassett, supra note 4, at 1223 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643).
A second statute passed in 1891 prohibited appellate judges from hearing appeals
from cases they had tried. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 3, 26 Stat. 826 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 47 (2000)); see Bassett at 1223-24.
51. Bassett, supra note 4, at 1224 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat.
1090).
52. Bassett, supra note 4, at 1224 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 21, 36 Stat.
1090).
53. Bassett, supra note 4, at 1225. Section 144 provides:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a
timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is
pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any
adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge
shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or
prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the
beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause
shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only
one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of
counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.
28 U.S.C. § 144 (2000).
Though broadly worded, the section's reach has been judicially narrowed, by
requiring that the source of the bias be from outside the courtroom (the so-called
"extrajudicial source doctrine") and that a "sufficient affidavit" set forth extensive
facts rather than conclusory allegations. Bloom, supra note 27, at 666-68; The
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§ 455, Congress made two changes. First, it made the provision self-

executing by removing the requirement that a party initiate
disqualification.54 Second, it added the word "substantial" before the
word "interest" as a ground for invoking the statute, thus giving
judges wide discretion to evaluate their
interests in a given case and
55

decide whether recusal was necessary.
The next major changes to § 455 took place in 1974.56 A host of
scandals and controversies had fueled the movement for change,

Appearance of Justice, supra note 37, at 237-49. Thus, it is difficult for litigants to
obtain a judge's recusal under § 144. In any event, the provision is limited to
challenges for bias and prejudice, and so has "little relevance" to the issue of
disqualification for financial conflicts of interest. Evers, supra note 4, at 358.
54. Bassett, supra note 4, at 1225.
55. Id.; Smith, supra note 19, at 268. The statute read:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case
in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a
material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or his
attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial,
appeal, or other proceeding therein.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970). Even actual bias was not a bar if it did not fall under one of
the three categories specified in the provision. See Flamm, supra note 20, § 23.5.2.
56. Bassett, supra note 4, at 1225. This "drastic change" made it easier, both
procedurally and substantively, for litigants to disqualify a judge. Brumbelow, supra
note 36, at 1072. The revised statute read:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in
controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served
during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or
such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity
participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the
proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular
case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor
child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter
in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to
either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial
interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal
financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.
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including the failure of the Senate to approve Justice Abe Fortas as
Chief Justice and the unsuccessful nomination of Judge Clement
The 1974 amendment
Haynsworth, Jr. to the Supreme Court.
rejected the "substantial interest" standard as too uncertain. Instead,
Congress established a per se disqualification rule, enumerating
several types of conflicts which automatically disqualify a judge.58
Under the new rule, even a de minimis financial interest required

(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases shall have
the meaning indicated:
(1) "proceeding" includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other stages of
litigation; the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law
system;
(3) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator,
trustee, and guardian;
(4) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equitable interest,
however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active
participant in the affairs of a party, except that:
(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities
is not a "financial interest" in such securities unless the judge participates in
the management of the fund;
(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic
organization is not a "financial interest" in securities held by the
organization;
(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance
company, of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar
proprietary interest, is a "financial interest" in the organization only if the
outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the
interest;
(iv) Ownership of government securities is a "financial interest" in the issuer
only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of
the securities.
(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate shall accept from the parties to the
proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in
subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises only under
subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full
disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1974).
57. Both the Fortas and Haynesworth episodes involved alleged conflicts of
interest. See Shawn P. Flaherty, Casenote, Liteky v. United States: The Entrenchment
of an ExtrajudicialSource Factor in the Recusal of FederalJudges Under 28 U.S.C. §
455(a), 15 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 411, 411 (1995). Justice Fortas resigned from the
Supreme Court in 1969 because of accusations that he had accepted improper
extrajudicial compensation. Bloom, supra note 27, at 672 n.53. Judge Haynesworth's
nomination to replace Justice Fortas failed because of allegations that he had
presided over cases in which he had conflicts of interest. Id. Other controversies
which generated negative publicity were Justice Rehnquist's decision not to recuse
himself in Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972), Bloom, supra note 27, at 672 n.53, and
Judge Sirica's refusal to withdraw from a Watergate trial, Evers, supra note 4, at 354.
For a critique of the Rehnquist decision, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal,
and Reform, 53 Brook. L. Rev. 589 (1987). For a critique of the Sirica decision, see
The Appearance of Justice, supra note 37.
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2000).
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disqualification. 9 Congress also added subsection (a), providing that
a judge must disqualify herself whenever her impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.6"
The goal of the changes was to raise public confidence in the

judiciary and in the impartial administration of justice6 ' and to bring
the statute in line with the American Bar Association's Code of
Judicial Conduct. 62 However, the per se rule generated vigorous
debate and opposition. 3 Critics, including the ABA's Committee on
Judicial Conduct, the Judicial Conference of the United States, and
several members of Congress, focused their opposition on the absence
of a provision allowing the parties to waive the conflict. 64 A waiver

provision would offer a potential solution in cases of de minimis
interests. One representative summed up the problem:
The necessary effect of this inflexible provision is that, by legislative
enactment, we could have a true Daniel come to judgment-or a
Learned Hand upon the bench-and if the case involved, let us say,
the Exxon Corporation, and the judge owned 20 shares of common
stock, which he had inherited from his parents many years before
and had never particularly thought of since, he absolutely could not
sit, even though both parties to the cause preferred him-because of
his expertise, learning, and integrity-to any and all other available
members of the judiciary.65

The legislative history, however, reflects an assumption by lawmakers
that in such a case a judge could simply divest of a small stock interest

59. Id. at § 455(d)(4).
60. See id. § 455(a).
61. "With a revised section 455, Congress sought to 'clarify and broaden the
grounds for judicial disqualification."' Brumbelow, supra note 36, at 1077, (quoting
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7 (1988)).
62. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 1-2 (1974). The 1972 version of the Code had
already been adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Id. at 3; see
also 119 Cong. Rec. S33,029-30 (daily ed. Oct. 4,1973) (statement of Sen. Burdick).
63. See In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 131.1-13 (9th Cir. 1982)
(recounting the legislative history of the 1974 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 455).
64. Id. In this respect, the new § 455 differed from the 1972 Code of Judicial
Conduct, which contained the following waiver provision:
Remittal of Disqualification.
A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3C(1) (c) or Canon 3C(1) (d)
may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the
basis of his disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and
lawyers, independently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that
the judge's relationship is immaterial or that his financial interest is
insubstantial, the judge is no longer disqualified, and may participate in the
proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be
incorporated in the record of the proceeding.
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(D) (1972), reprinted in E. Wayne Thode,
Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct 17 (1973).
65. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 15 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dennis).

2003]

JUDGES' FINANCIAL HOLDINGS

1681

and continue to preside.66
The year 1988 marked the most recent amendment to § 455: the
addition of subsection (f).67 This new provision was intended to
address the special problems raised by class action suits, 68 which had
been brought into sharp relief by the case of In re Cement.69 There,
the Ninth Circuit held that a judge who had presided over a
multidistrict antitrust class action for over five years had to recuse
himself when he learned that his wife owned stock in seven of the
more than 210,000 plaintiff class members-giving her a financial
stake of barely thirty dollars in the outcome of the suit.70 The
amendment provided for divestment of an inconsequential financial
interest "in a party" discovered at a late stage in the litigation as an

66. The possibility of divestment of inconsequential interests was offered as a
justification for adopting the per se rule:
With respect to this change, the issue is very simple: For example, if the
financial interest is but a few shares of stock in a corporation, such a small
holding is probably but a small part of the judge's investments and there
would be no great loss to him if he should decide to change that investment in
order to eliminate any possible grounds of disqualification. On the other
hand, if the number of shares represents a large investment, no one could
question that ownership of such shares requires disqualification.
119 Cong. Rec. S33,029-30 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1973) (comments of Sen. Burdick)
(emphasis added); see also Disqualificationof Judges and Justices, supra note 34, at
752 ("[A] strict per se rule will not work a great hardship against a judge, for if the
interest is so small that no reasonable man could suspect bias, the judge can easily
divest himself of the interest rather than disqualify himself."). Chief Justice Stone, for
example, sold investments a number of times in order to avoid recusing himself.
Disqualificationof Judges and Justices, supra note 34, at n.68.
67. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Subsection (f) provides:
Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any justice,
judge, magistrate, or bankruptcy judge to whom a matter has been assigned
would be disqualified, after substantial judicial time has been devoted to the
matter, because of the appearance or discovery, after the matter was
assigned to him or her, that he or she individually or as a fiduciary, or his or
her spouse or minor child residing in his or her household, has a financial
interest in a party (other than an interest that could be substantially affected
by the outcome),. disqualification is not required if the justice, judge,
magistrate, bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor child, as the case may be,
divests himself or herself of the interest that provides the grounds for the
disqualification.
28 U.S.C. § 455(f) (2000).
68. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
69. In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra notes
16,20.
70. In re Cement, 688 F.2d at 1300, 1313. Judge Muecke's wife did not wish to sell
the stock. It is possible that this fact-rather than the de minimis interest itself-was
the real story behind the Ninth Circuit's holding that the per se rule applied. In re
Indus. Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 80-C-3479, 1985 WL 2869, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24,
1985). If the law at the time indeed sanctioned voluntary divestment as a cure, that
would mean Congress misread the case and drafted an amendment to address a
problem that did not exist.
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alternative to the judge's disqualification.71
C. FinancialInterests Under28 U.S. C. § 455
The current 28 U.S.C. § 45572 addresses two main categories of

situations requiring disqualification: one involving a proscribed
relationship with, or interest in, the matter in controversy, and the
other involving either actual prejudice concerning a party or the
appearance of bias.73 Though most financial interests fall into the first

category, an interest may create an appearance of bias even if it is not
explicitly proscribed.
1. Subsection (a): Appearance Matters
Subsection (a) of § 455 reads: "Any justice, judge, or magistrate of
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which

his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."7 4 This subsection is

a general, "catch-all" provision 75 requiring that a judge disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which there is an objective risk that he
will be perceived as biased.76 Under this provision, it does not matter
whether the judge is actually biased.77 By deferring to an objective

71. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(f). For the full text of subsection (f), see supra note 67.
72. For the full text of the statute, see supra notes 56, 67.
73. See Charles Malarkey, Note, Judicial Disqualification: Is Sexual Orientation
Cause in California?, 41 Hastings L.J. 695, 703 n.51 (1990) (citing Prof. Moore).
According to Moore, the second type of case differs markedly from the first in that it
involves a great deal more discretion on the part of the challenged judge. Id.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).
75. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974).
76.
[T]o say that § 455(a) requires concern for appearances is not to say that it
requires concern for mirages.
The standard ... is applied "not by
considering what a straw poll of the only partly informed man-in-the-street
would show-but by examining the record facts and the law, and then
deciding whether a reasonable person knowing and understanding all the
relevant facts would recuse the judge."
United States v. EI-Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. 955, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (quoting In re
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1313 (2d Cir. 1988)).
By introducing an objective disqualification standard, the 1974 amendment to
§ 455 had the effect of eliminating the so-called "duty to sit," which had become a
gloss on the statute. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974). The "duty to sit"
operated as a presumption in favor of the assigned judge's remaining on the case,
unless and until an unambiguous showing of bias was made. See Flamm, supra note
20, § 20.10.1. Nevertheless, the notion that judges should avoid recusing themselves
unless absolutely necessary-and may not recuse themselves to get out of hearing
difficult cases-still carries weight. See In re Drexel, 861 F.2d at 1312 ("A judge is as
much obliged not to recuse himself when it is not called for as he is obliged to when it
is."); accord Carter v. West Publ'g Co., No. 99-11959, 1999 WL 994997, at *6-7 (11th
Cir. Nov. 1, 1999).
77. See supra note 26. For a detailed analysis of the application of § 455(a), see
Kenneth M. Fall, Note, Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.: The Supreme
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standard, subsection (a) allows a judge to recuse herself, or an
appellate court to order her recusal, without having to actually
impugn her impartiality.78
The appearance of bias test has been criticized, however, on the
grounds that it distracts both judges and policymakers from
identifying what is and is not unjust.79 If there is a substantive
objection to the judge's presiding, that should be reason enough to
disqualify her." If an examination of the facts dispels what at first
might seem plausible objections, the judge can remove the appearance
problem by explaining why the objections fail." Recusal on the basis
of possible speculation alone, the argument goes, serves no bona fide
purpose.
Analysis of the possible appearance of partiality under subsection
(a) is not limited only to facts or interests not implicated by the
analysis under subsection (b), 2 which enumerates various
disqualifying circumstances. Any interest, even one excepted by the
language of subsection (b), is subject to the appearance of bias test. 3
Therefore, when a judge deems subsection (b) inapplicable, the
analysis must shift to subsection (a) to determine whether recusal is
nonetheless required.'
Disqualification under subsection (a) can,
Court Encourages Disqualification of Federal Judges Under Section 455(a), 1989 Wis.
L. Rev. 1033. In Liljeberg, 486 U.S. 847, 850 (1988), the Supreme Court held, in a
five-to-four decision, that if on appeal it is determined that an objective observer
would believe that the judge should have been aware of the conflict of interest, the
judge may be retroactively disqualified. The Court further held that a final judgment
may be vacated on these grounds. Id. Therefore, judges have an incentive to disclose
possible grounds for disqualification because they can be reversed later if the interest
is found out. See Fall, supra, at 1054.
78. See Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at 243.
79. Id. at 278.
80. Id.
81. Id. While he ultimately takes issue with the appearance standard, Professor
Leubsdorf recognizes its merit in maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary. "This standard makes it clear to the challenged judge that belief in her own
purity will not suffice; she must consider how others will view her conduct." Id.; cf
Tenth Circuit Survey, Professional Responsibility: Comments on Recusal, 73 Denv. U.
L. Rev. 919, 921 (1996) ("There are no close cases. You either are or are not biased."
(comment of Judge Kelly)).
82. See In re Certain Underwriter, 294 F.3d 297, 305 (2d Cir. 2002).
83. See Disqualification of Judges and Justices, supra note 34, at 752 n.66. For
example, even an interest in a mutual fund, if extraordinarily large, could present
grounds for disqualification. Id. Another example of this is a case in which the
defendant paid a substantial amount of rent which was eventually credited to the
judge's spouse as the sole beneficiary of a trust managed by the lessor as trustee. See
Financial Interest: Judge's Spouse Beneficiary of a Trust from which Defendant
Leases Property, 2 Advisory Op. U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of
Conduct No. 27 (1998), available at www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/27.html.
84. See In re Certain Underwriter, 294 F.3d at 305. See generally Perpich v.
Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 927 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Mich. 1996); NEC Corp. v. Intel
Corp., 654 F. Supp. 1256 (N.D. Cal. 1987), vacated as moot on other grounds, appeal
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however, be waived by the parties.
The review of a recusal decision under subsection (a) is "extremely
fact intensive." 5 For example, in Liljeberg v. Health Services
Acquisition Corp.,6 the Supreme Court held that a judge who was a
trustee of a university which had a financial interest in the litigation
was retroactively disqualified under subsection (a), even if, as the
judge claimed, he lacked actual knowledge of the university's interest
at the time of the trial." The Court noted, among other striking facts,
that the judge had faithfully attended Board of Trustees meetings for
years, and negotiations on the project at issue had appeared on the
agenda of a meeting attended by the judge only a few days before the
lawsuit was filed."8 As a general rule, however, courts have cautioned
against reading subsection (a) too broadly so as to make it
presumptive. 9
dismissed, 835 F.2d 1546 (9th Cir. 1988). In NEC, the district court reasoned:
Congress did not conclude that any interest, no matter how small, in a party
raises a question as to a judge's impartiality.... NEC's suggested
interpretation of section 455(a) would make section 455(b)(4) superfluous; if
a judge is disqualified under section 455(a) as of the date an objective
observer would conclude that he has knowledge of a financial interest...
then a fortiori he is disqualified whenever he has actual knowledge of an
interest.
NEC Corp., 654 F. Supp. at 1259; see also Flamm, supra note 20, § 24.1.
85. See Republic of Panama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 217 F.3d 343, 346 (5th Cir.
2000).
86. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
87. Id. at 850, 858-59. The Supreme Court pointed out that "scienter is not an
element of a violation of § 455(a)." Id. at 859. The Court took the drastic step of
vacating the judgment of the district judge. Id. at 870.
88. Id. at 865.
89. See United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[J]udges are not
to recuse themselves lightly under § 455(a)."); United States v. Pappert, No. CRIM.A.-942001601, 1998 WL 596707, at *7 (D. Kan. July 29, 1998) ("[S]ection 455(a) must
not be so broadly construed that it becomes, in effect, presumptive, so that recusal is
mandated upon the merest unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice."
(citation and quotation marks omitted)); Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 733 (D.
Idaho 1981) ("[A] broad or liberal application of section 455(a) appears to be against
the spirit of section 455. For example, if a judge disqualifies himself upon mere
application, or mere allegation that his appearance of impartiality might be
questioned, it would make the nonperemptive statute in effect peremptive and
encourage judge-shopping ....
"). This caution is firmly rooted in the legislative
history:
[I]n assessing the reasonableness of a challenge to his impartiality, each
judge must be alert to avoid the possibility that those who would question
his impartiality are in fact seeking to avoid the consequences of his expected
adverse decision. Disqualification ...must have a reasonablebasis. Nothing
in this proposed legislation should be read to warrant the transformation of
a litigant's fear that a judge may decide a question against him into a
"reasonable fear" that the judge will not be impartial. Litigants ought not
have to face a judge where there is a reasonable question of impartiality, but
they are not entitled to judges of their own choice.
H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974); see also supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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2. Subsection (b): The Per Se Rule
Subsection (b) is both stricter and broader than subsection (a). 9"
For one thing, it allows for almost no discretion on the part of the
92
judge.9 For another, there is no waiver provision applicable to it.
Subsection (b) provides, in pertinent part, that a judge shall disqualify
himself if:
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding...
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding ...
Notably, subsection (b) incorporates the proviso that a judge is only
disqualified for interests of which he is aware. 94 This knowledge
requirement can make all the difference.95
Under the so-called per se rule of subsection (b)(4), a judge is
disqualified if she, her spouse, or minor child in her household has a
financial interest, however small, in the "subject matter in
controversy" or in a party, or any other interest that might be
substantially affected by the outcome of the case.96 Without the
90. See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 859-60 n.8; Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d
1510, 1527 (1 1th Cir. 1988); see also Reilly v. Hussey, 989 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir.
1993) (involving a judge's erroneous acceptance of a waiver of a subsection (b)
conflict).
91. The only place where the judge must exercise discretion is in deciding whether
or not an interest classified as "any other interest" could be "substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2000).
92. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (waiver provision applying to subsection (a) cases
only). Because conflicts under subsection (b) are unwaivable, the timeliness of a
motion for disqualification may be less important when the motion is brought under
this provision as opposed to under subsection (a). See Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666
F.2d 116, 121-22 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b).
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), (5)(iii). The judge might know about the interest
himself, or a party might bring it to his attention after discovering it through
investigation. For a discussion of conflict disclosures, see infra Part I.C.3.
95. See infra Part I.C.3; see also Smith, supra note 19, at 265-66 (citing a California
case construing a state disqualification statute that contained no knowledge
requirement, the absence of which rendered the judge's and parties' ignorance of the
judge's conflict immaterial).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), (d)(4). Subsection (d) also lists exceptions to the per se
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benefit of legislative history, courts have struggled to define the
phrase "subject matter in controversy."97 Courts generally interpret it
to mean a financial interest in an entity, other than a party, on which
the case will have a direct effect.9" In the case of class actions in which
a judge or a family member owns stock in an absent or putative class
member, courts have strained to define the scope of the term "party,"
reaching differing conclusions about whether absent or putative class
members are akin to parties. 99 The statute also does not define "any

other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding."""'

Courts have held that the clause refers to

substantial indirect interests, whether financial or of some other
kind."" Professor Wright's test assesses this type of "other interest"
based on the "interaction of two variables: the remoteness of the

interest and its extent or degree."" 2 As the possibility and extent of
rule, such as passive investment in a mutual fund. Id. § 455(d)(4)(iii). The interest of
adult children, or of minor children not living in the household, is considered under
subsection (a)'s "residuary appearance of partiality clause." See Leslie W. Abramson,
Specifying Grounds for Judicial Disqualificationin Federal Courts, 72 Neb. L. Rev.

1046, 1070 (1993).
97. See, e.g., Sollenbarger v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 706 F. Supp. 776,
780 (D.N.M. 1989) ("Congress provided little explicit guidance on the meaning of this
phrase. It is not defined later in the statute. Neither the parties nor the court have
found any legislative history on the phrase."). One view is that "subject matter in
controversy" is meant to apply to in rem proceedings. Id.
98. Id. at 781. In Native American land claim cases in which a judge owned land
near the claim area but outside its perimeters, the court held that while the judge did
have a financial interest, the possibility that his property's value might drop was not a
direct interest sufficient to disqualify him under this provision. See Oglala Sioux Tribe
of Pine Ridge Indian Reservation v. Homestake Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir.
1983); Chitimacha Tribe of La. v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1982),
cited in Sollenbarger, 706 F. Supp. at 781. Similarly, "subject matter in controversy"
does not include ownership of stock in companies within the same industry as a party,
even where the outcome of the case will affect the whole industry. See, e.g., In re
Placid Oil Co., 802 F.2d 783, 786-87 (5th Cir. 1986).
99. See infra Part II.A.2.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).
101. See Bloom, supra note 27, at 678. Some commentators contend that this
provision applies only to pecuniary insubstantial interests, id., but the plain language
of the statute does not support such an interpretation. See also Abramson, supra note
96, at 1073.
102. 13A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3547,
at 603 (2d ed. 1984), cited in In re Va. Elec. and Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 368 (4th Cir.
1976) (finding that the judge's potential for a $70-$100 utility refund was de minimis
and therefore disqualification was not required). A judge's interest as taxpayer or
ratepayer of a public utility is not disqualifying because it is akin to a "bare
expectancy," too remote and diluted to be legally cognizable. See In re N.M. Natural
Gas Antitrust Litig., 620 F.2d 794, 796 (10th Cir. 1980) ("Congress did not intend to
require disqualification in all cases in which the judge might benefit as a member of
the general public."); In re Va. Elec., 539 F.2d at 367-68. This is so unless the outcome
of the suit could uniquely affect the amount to be paid by the judge. See
Disqualification When the Judge Is a Utility Ratepayer or Taxpayer, 2 Advisory Op.
U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct No. 78 (1998), available at

20031

JUDGES' FINANCIAL HOLDINGS

1687

the interest decrease, so does the need for recusal.'013 For example, an
interest in a subsidiary
or parent company of a party is evaluated as
' 4
"any other interest."'

The judge must ascertain the level of control

exercised by the parent over the subsidiary to determine whether
recusal is required.' Under any of the clauses of subsection (b)(4), in
order to constitute a cognizable ground for disqualification, the
interest must be a "real, certain, present, immediate, and
demonstrable financial interest..,
and one that is capable of
0 6
estimated monetary valuation.'

Under subsection (b)(5), a judge is also disqualified if she or her
spouse, "or a person within the third degree of relationship to either

of them, or the spouse of such a person," is a party to the proceeding
or is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially

affected by the suit." 7 In a class action, the judge or her family
member's stock holding can make either of them a putative or absent

class member, and here again, confusion arises in determining
whether the judge ' or
her family member would, as such, be
8
considered a "party. "

www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/78.html.
103. Evers, supra note 4, at 362.
104. See MDCM Holdings, Inc. v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 205 F. Supp. 2d
158, 162-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
105. Id. at 162-63.
The key question is whether the company in which the judge owns stock has
effective control over the party to the litigation-that is, at least 50% of the
voting stock or a majority of the capital interest in the party.... [B]ecause
AOL and Intel [companies in which the judge owned stock, whose stock
price would not be substantially affected by the outcome of the litigation] do
not exercise control over any of the issuer defendants, my stock ownership
does not trigger the disqualification provision of section 455(b)(4).
Id.; cf Key Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 480, 484 (W.D. Pa. 1998)
(holding disqualification unnecessary where the judge's ownership interest was in the
parent company with "diverse interests and revenues in the billions, [and] the
litigation involves only one of its subsidiaries and one of its product lines and no
substantial affect on the value of the stock of the parent has been shown."). See also
Disqualification in a Case When Controlled Subsidiary of a Corporation in which
Judge Owns Stock Is a Party, 2 Advisory Op. U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on
Codes of Conduct No. 57 (1998), available at www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/57.html.
Sen. Bayh once proposed amending § 455 to set an arbitrary cutoff point that would
disqualify a judge owning stock in a company holding 10% of the corporate party, or
in a company 10% of which was held by the corporate party. See Disqualificationof
Judges and Justices,supra note 34, at 753 n.73.
106. Flamm, supra note 20, § 7.4.1.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i), (iii) (2000). The third degree of relationship, as
defined by the civil law system, includes only blood relatives, namely: the judge's or
judge's spouse's parent, grandparent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, niece, nephew, son,
or daughter. Abramson, supra note 96, at 1065 n.72.
108. See infra Part II.A.2.
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3. Subsection (c): Knowledge Is Power
Judges have a duty to stay informed about their financial
holdings.1 9 Subsection (c) requires a judge to "inform himself about
his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable
effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his
spouse and minor children residing in his household.""" Without
subsection (c), judges could seek to avoid per se disqualification under
subsection (b) by deliberately remaining ignorant of their investments.
Even if they were not deliberately turning a blind eye, judges, like
many passive investors who use brokers, often do not know exactly
what is in their portfolios at a given moment."' Therefore, courts
have devised "conflict check" procedures, often involving a "conflicts
list," to identify potentially disqualifying financial holdings at the
earliest possible time." 2 This is not a foolproof process, however. 13
109. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(c).
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 70, 80 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), affd sub nom., In re Certain Underwriter, 294 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2002)
[hereinafter In re IPO] ("I am really one of those sad investors. The brokers call, I
say 'yes, goodbye'; they say 'sell,' I say 'yes, goodbye."'); Key Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan
Labs., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 480, 481 (W.D. Pa. 1998) ("My financial holdings in the
form of stocks in my IRA account are handled by a professional investment
management service and are not selected by me.").
112. "1 obtain a daily report via ... e-mail of the stocks in which the managers
invest. Each day I and my secretary check the holdings against our list of pending
cases.... Even when there is no change in the IRA or my private portfolio, the list
must be checked because of the addition of new parties to existing cases." Key
Pharm., 24 F. Supp. 2d at 481 & n.l. The judge's portfolio may also change as a result
of companies merging or being acquired. See NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 654 F. Supp.
1256, 1258 (N.D. Cal. 1987), vacated as moot on other grounds, appeal dismissed, 835
F.2d 1546 (9th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Pappert, No. CRIM.-A.-942001601,
1998 WL 596707, at *3 (D. Kan. July 29, 1998) (explaining that a court staff member
was assigned to check conflicts). The chore can be onerous. "Given the three to four
hundred pending cases and the multiplicity of parties, many of which are publicly held
and have numerous affiliated entities, this is a daunting task." Key Pharm., 24 F.
Supp. 2d at 481 n.1. In some jurisdictions, local court rules require parties to submit
certificates identifying any corporate or other parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates. See,
e.g., New York (S.D. & E.D.) Local Civ. Rule 1.9. Sometimes, in large cases, the
judge may hand over the information and ask the parties to conduct the conflict
check. See, e.g., In re IPO, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 77-78.
113. See supra notes 15, 112; see also Perpich v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 927 F.
Supp. 226, 227 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (noting that the judge's discovery of the fact that
a limited partnership in which he had participated owned stocks occurred by
happenstance in conversation with his father); In re Indus. Gas Antitrust Litig., No.
80-C- 3479, 1985 WL 2869, at *5 (N.D. I11.
Sept. 24, 1985). One judge observed,
While I knew that my husband owned shares of IBM and Eastman Kodak, I
did not know those companies were class members, and it was not apparent
to me that such companies would be purchasers of industrial gas. While I do
have some idea as to the likely consumers of cylinder quantities of industrial
gas, because that subject has been discussed in the course of this litigation, I
have no idea how or wh[y] companies such as IBM and Eastman Kodak use
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In order to allow the parties to conduct their own investigations, the
1978 Ethics in Government Act'14 requires judges to file annual
financial disclosure forms with the clerk of court."5 Unfortunately,
the forms are not designed to cover all the bases for disqualification
under subsection (b). For example, holdings of less than $1000 and
gifts of less than $100 are not disclosed on the forms, even though they
are subject to § 455(b)(4)'s per se disqualification rule for financial
interests."6 To forestall potential disruption to the litigation later on,
the judge should disclose to the parties any financial conflict as soon
as she becomes aware of it.
4. Subsection (f): A Time to Divest
Subsection (f) provides, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any...
judge ... would be disqualified, after substantial judicial time has

been devoted to the matter, because of the appearance or discovery,
after the matter was assigned to him or her, that he or she.., or his
or her spouse or minor child.., has a financial interest in a party
(other than an interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome), disqualification is not required if the.., judge,... spouse
or minor child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself
1 7 of the
interest that provides the grounds for the disqualification."
Congress added this subsection to § 455 in 1988 with the goal of
addressing the situation in which a judge learns of an interest in a
party when the litigation is already in an advanced stage." 8 This
industrial gas.
Id.

114. Codified as 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-12 (2000).
115. Id. The judge must also sign a certification, subject to criminal and civil
penalties, that she has complied with the disclosure requirements of § 455 and Canon
3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. See CRC Report, supra note 39. Yet, "the mere
fact that a judge has filed such a report does not conclusively establish that he
possesses the knowledge of a financial interest in a party that is required for
disqualification under § 455(b)(4)." Flamm, supra note 20, § 24.6.5, (citing NEC, 654
F. Supp. at 1258 ("[N]otwithstanding the statutory obligation to keep informed, it is
only human for a judge's attention to flag or be distracted at times.")); see, e.g., CRC
Report, supra note 39 (relating that judges had listed the stock holdings at issue on
their disclosure forms but claimed to have subsequently forgotten about them).
116. See In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litig., 515 F. Supp. 1076, 1080-81 (D.
Ariz. 1981); CRC Report, supra note 39.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 455(f) (2000). For the full text of this subsection, see supra note
67.
118. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. In 1980, the Judicial
Conference of the United States had proposed adding a subsection (f) which would
allow a waiver of disqualification when a financial interest in a party was discovered
after substantial judicial time, or in the absence of waiver, for the judge to remain on
the case if he determined "that the public interest in avoiding the cost of delay of
reassignment outweighs any appearance of impropriety arising from his continuing
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problem is especially common in class actions." 9 A judge's interest in
a class member may remain undiscovered even for years 21' because of
the amount of time required to compile a full class list.' 21 Where the
judge has invested "substantial judicial time" before she learns of the
interest, subsection (f) allows the judge to continue presiding 2 2 if she,
123
her spouse, or minor child in the household divest of the interest,
provided that the interest is not one that could be "substantially

affected by the outcome of the suit."'1 24 Subsection (f) would,
hypothetically, apply even if the holding or the circumstances of the
divestiture2 might reasonably call the judge's impartiality into
question. 1
The meaning of "substantial judicial time" is open to wide
interpretation. Since neither the statute nor the legislative history
define the term, courts have tried tortuously to do so, with sometimes
inconsistent results. 26 Where the pendency of a case is long enough to
be counted in years rather than months and the judge has been

actively working on it over that time, all courts would agree that
subsection (f) is satisfied. 127 But one court has deemed the significant
with the matter to completion." Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United
States (Mar. 5-6; Sept. 24-25, 1980), at 81.
119. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
120. See Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Serv., Inc., 782 F.2d 710, 713 (7th Cir.
1986); In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1982).
121. In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d at 1299-1300.
122. The judge must cease making any rulings in the case from the time the interest
is discovered until it is divested. See Union Carbide, 782 F.2d at 714; Flamm, supra
note 20, § 24.10.
123. Divestiture is always permissive. Congress hoped, however, that judges and
their family members would oblige, rather than force reassignment of the case: "In
most instances, it is anticipated that the judge or his family members would be
cooperative in seeking to promote the public interest to [sic] avoiding the costs of
delay or reassignment in this manner." H.R. Doc. No. 100-889, at 69 (1988).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 455(f) (2000). An interest consisting of a major stock holding in a
closely held corporation, for example, would not be curable by divestment. See H.R.
Doc. No. 100-889, at 69 (1988). It is the size of the interest relative to the corporation
that is relevant to determining whether the interest could be "substantially affected by
the outcome," rather than the size of the interest vis A vis the judge's portfolio.
125. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(f) (providing that the subsection applies
"[n]otwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section [including subsection
(a)]"). If the judge or her family member incurred considerable brokerage fees or
capital gains taxes or lost out on an extraordinary market gain as a result of the
divestment, a reasonable person might question whether the judge now harbors some
grudge against that party to the litigation. Yet the language of subsection (f) does not
take that reality into account.
126. See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Kidder, Peabody & Co., v. Maxus Energy Corp., 925 F.2d 556, 561
(2d Cir. 1991) (concluding straightforwardly that subsection (f) applied because
"nearly three years of the litigants' time and resources and substantial judicial efforts
have been devoted"); see also Key Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d
480, 482-83 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that fourteen months was enough).
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passage of time itself enough, despite the fact that the judge had
devoted only minimal attention to the case during the two-year
period.128 On the other hand, the Second Circuit recently held that a
mere two months-chock-full of organizational and managerial effort
but no substantive orders-constituted "substantial judicial time.' 2 9
In another case, the Federal Circuit held that a judge's divestment of a
financial conflict of interest two months after the complaint was filed
fit within subsection (f) because the motion for disqualification was
not made until more than a year later. 130 It appears that unless a court
has devoted only minimal time to a case in a short period before a
motion for disqualification is brought, the judge can defend her cure
by divestiture under the "substantial judicial time" requirement of
subsection (f).
D. The Code of JudicialConduct
In addition to the various constitutional and statutory bases for
disqualification, a set of ethical rules also requires judges to recuse
themselves under certain circumstances. The primary source of
judicial ethics rules is the American Bar Association's Code of
Judicial Conduct.' Although 28 U.S.C. § 455 takes precedence over
the Code when requiring disqualification," there could be situations
in which the statute would not mandate the judge's recusal, but the
spirit, if not the letter, of the Code would.'33
1. History
The ABA published the first Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1924."'
These general, hortatory pronouncements did not prove very

128. See Perpich v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 927 F. Supp. 226, 230 (E.D. Mich.
1996) (deeming two-year pendency of case enough to satisfy subsection (f) even
though the judge had not entered any substantive decisions during that time, noting
that the parties had spent substantial time on the case).
129. See In re Certain Underwriter, 294 F.3d 297, 299, 301-02, 304 (2d Cir. 2002).
"[M]easuring 'substantial judicial time' means examining the time and effort a district
court invests in a matter, rather than simply counting off days on the calendar to see if
'substantial' time passed." Id. at 304.
130. See Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. Franksu Enter. Corp., 78 F.3d 550 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
131. Flamm, supra note 20, § 2.6.1.
132. Id. § 2.6.3; H.R. Rep. 93-1453, at 2-3 (1974).
133. See In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litig., 515 F. Supp. 1076, 1079 (D.
Ariz. 1981) ("Even if I could legally proceed with a case, I would refuse to do so if I
were to determine that it was ethically improper."); see also In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988); Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Mo. v.
Missouri, 438 F. Supp. 830, 835 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
134. Shaman, Lubet & Alfini, supra note 17, § 1.02. Chief Justice William Howard
Taft headed the drafting committee. Id.

1692

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

helpful. 35 A more concrete, less morally intoned set of Canons
followed in 1972: The Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 36 This Code
marked the first use of the "appearance of bias" test that was later
incorporated into § 455(a). 37 A third, more minor revision took place
in 1990, adding more detail to the rules. 38 All but one of the states 3 9
14
has enacted either the 1972 or 1990 versions of the Code. 0
The Judicial Conference of the United States, the administrative
body governing the federal judiciary, has adopted the more recent
version of the Model Code as the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges.1 41 The effect of this measure is unclear. Because the Judicial
Conference has no specific statutory grant of authority to enact
binding ethical rules, 42 the Code does not have the force of law. 143 As
such, it is of minimal value to litigants as a basis for disqualifying a
federal judge.'" Still, the judge herself must give due consideration to
the Code's ethical standards.'4 5 The Judicial Conference's Advisory
Committee on Codes of Conduct also issues advisory opinions
interpreting the Code for the aid of federal judges. 146
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Disqualificationof Judges and Justices, supra note 34, at 745.
138. Shaman et al., supra note 17, § 1.02.
139. Montana remains the only non-Code state. See id. It does, however, have a set
of judicial conduct rules similar to the Model Codes. Id.
140. Id.; see also Flamm, supra note 20, § 2.6 n.2.
141. Flamm, supra note 20, § 2.6 n.2. On the federal level, the Code covers district
and appellate judges, but not justices of the Supreme Court. Disqualification of
Judges and Justices, supra note 34, at 743 n.29.
142. Bassett, supra note 4, at 1230; Disqualificationof Judges and Justices, supra
note 34, at 744 n.29.
143. Bassett, supra note 4, at 1230. The Code's provisions do, however, "closely
parallel those of § 455." Id.
144. See Flamm, supra note 20, § 2.6.3. According to one view, litigants have no
standing to invoke the Code. Id. § 2.6.4.
145. Id. § 2.6.4. Just how much consideration a judge should give to the Codeparticularly where its heightened concern with maintaining integrity and respect for
the judiciary would warrant self-recusal even where § 455 would not-is unclear. Id.
According to Judge John W. Oliver,
It is my view that the duty to recuse stated in the Code of Judicial
Conduct ...establishes a higher standard than that imposed by any of the
various statutes passed by the Congress. It is clear to me that in some
exceptional cases a judge may be under duty to deny a motion to disqualify
based on statutory grounds but that, consistently with the higher standard
enunciated in the Code ...he should nevertheless take himself out of the
case.
Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Mo. v. Missouri, 438 F. Supp. 830, 835 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
146. See Shaman et al., supra note 17, § 1.11. The same question as to the proper
amount of weight to be given exists with regard to the Advisory Opinions. See In re
Indus. Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 80-C-3479, 1985 WL 2869, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24,
1985) ("Interpretation of the Code is within the Committee's charter, and the
Committee's collective opinion is therefore entitled to some, but not controlling,
weight in interpreting the statute.").
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2. Canon 3: Disqualification
Canon 3(E) 47 of the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct
addresses disqualification. However, the first mention of the issue
comes slightly earlier in the Canon under the listing of a judge's
Adjudicative Responsibilities: "A judge shall hear and decide matters
assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is
required."' 4 s The grounds for disqualification identified in the Canon
largely comport with 28 U.S.C. § 455,149 with three exceptions.
First, a financial interest of the judge's "parent or child wherever
residing, or any other member of the judge's family residing in the
judge's household" is disqualifying under the Canon,15 ° whereas 28
U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) only disqualifies a judge for 151an interest of the
judge, his spouse, or minor child residing with him.
152
Second, the Canon provides an exception for de minimis interests,
in contrast to 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4), which defines a disqualifying
financial interest
as "ownership of a legal or equitable interest,
1' 53
however small.'
Third, the Canon permits the parties to waive the judge's
disqualification for "any basis... other than personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party. ' 154 Section 455 takes a contrary
approach, allowing waiver where the ground for disqualification is
but in no
that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
55
other circumstances, including financial interests.
As to the first of these differences, a judge would simply be

147. The equivalent section in the 1972 version is Canon 3(C). See Thode, supra
note 64, at 14.
148. Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(1) (1990) [hereinafter Model
Code], reprinted in Flamm, supra note 20, at app. A (containing the text of the entire
Code).
149. See supra note 143; see also H.R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 1, 3 (1974).
150. Model Code, Canon 3(E)(1)(c), supra note 148.
151. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2000).
152. Model Code, Canon 3(E)(1)(c), supra note 148. This subsection of the Canon
provides that the following interests are disqualifying: "an economic interest in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding or... any other more
than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding." Id.
(emphasis added). Thus, by its plain language, the exception for de minimis interests
seems to apply only to interests falling into the category of "any other interest." See
supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of the phrase "any
other interest"). But see Shaman et al., supra note 17, § 4.20 (suggesting that the
exception applies to all interests). Subsection (d)(iii) of Canon 3(E) also exempts de
minimis interests. See Model Code, Canon 3(E)(d)(iii), supra note 148.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4).
154. Model Code, Canon 3(F), supra note 148. This provision differs slightly from
the 1972 version of the Code, quoted supra note 64. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (allowing
waiver in cases involving the possible appearance of partiality only).
155. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e).
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following a stricter path by adhering to the Canon. As to the other
differences, however, the judge must abide by the narrower provisions
of the statute.
3. Canon 4: Regulation of Business Activities
Canon 4 addresses the extent to which judges can engage in outside
business pursuits. The Canon exhorts judges to "So Conduct [Their]
Extra-Judicial Activities as to Minimize the Risk of Conflict with
'
Judicial Obligations."156
Judges should "not engage in financial and
business dealings that.., involve the judge in frequent transactions or
continuing business relationships with those lawyers or other persons
likely to come before the court on which the judge serves."'5 7
Investing is expressly permitted, 5 ' but with a careful eye to the
prevention of likely conflicts, the appearance of partiality,'59 and the
need for recusal. 1 The Canon directs judges to manage their finances
with the goal of minimizing the number of cases in which they will be
disqualified, particularly by divesting of interests "that might require
frequent disqualification."''
The Code prohibits judges from
occupying corporate positions or exercising any sort of control over a
business, other than a family business.'62
The Code's extensive guidelines and accompanying commentary
may be helpful to judges in conducting their extra-judicial affairs.
Similarly, Advisory Opinions interpreting the Code, whose
disqualification provisions generally parallel the statute's, have proved
a useful resource for judges facing recusal motions.'6 3 But the 1974
amendment to § 455, which largely brought the statute into line with
the Code's approach to disqualification, diminished the latter's
156. Model Code, Canon 4, supra note 148. See also Model Code, Canon 2, which
cautions judges to "Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of
the Judge's Activities."
157. Model Code, Canon 4(D)(1)(b), supra note 148.
158. Model Code, Canon 4(D)(4), supra note 148. "A judge has the rights of any
other citizen, including the right to privacy of the judge's financial affairs, except to
the extent that limitations established by law are required to safeguard the proper
performance of the judge's duties." Model Code, Canon 4(I), Commentary, supra
note 148.
159. See Model Code, Canon 4(D)(1), Commentary, supra note 148.
160. Model Code, Canon 4(D)(4), supra note 148.
161. Id. The feasibility of this advice in practice is open to question. See supra note
22 and accompanying text.
162. Model Code, Canon 4(D)(3), supra note 148.
163. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipeline, 719 F.2d 733,
735 (5th Cir. 1983); MDCM Holdings, Inc. v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 205 F.
Supp. 2d 158, 162 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Perpich v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 927 F.
Supp. 226, 231 (E.D. Mich. 1996); In re Indus. Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 80-C-3479,
1985 WL 2869, at *3, Ex. A, B (N.D. I1. 1985); In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust
Litig., 515 F. Supp. 1076,1079 (D.Ariz. 1981).
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relevance in this area of the law."6 Nevertheless, litigants, and hence
courts, continue to cite the Code as an alternative ground for
disqualification decisions. 65
Contemporary judicial disqualification law takes a strict approach
to financial interests, viewing an interest of any amount as vitiating a
judge's impartiality. As Part II demonstrates, however, applying the
language of 28 U.S.C. § 455 to real-world cases can present knotty
problems for courts.
II.

APPLYING THE STATUTE TO THE CASES: QUESTIONS AND
INCONSISTENCIES

Currently, a federal judge faced with a decision about whether to
recuse based on a financial interest will find herself in an area of the
law fraught with questions for which there are often no satisfactory
answers, particularly when it comes to class actions. Perhaps the only
line in the sand is that a judge may never continue to preside over a
case while knowing that she or a family member has a financial
interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party.'6 6 This part
explores the caselaw on whether a putative or absent class memberout of hundreds, thousands, or even tens of thousands-counts as a
"party to the proceeding," or something short of that. It also
examines whether a judge who becomes aware of a financial interest
167
at an early stage of litigation can cure the conflict by divesting.
Finally, it outlines a previous proposal for amendment to 28 U.S.C. §
455 and the reasons for its failure.
A. Adjudicating in Murky Waters
Subsection (f) of 28 U.S.C. § 455, though intended to address class
action situations, 68 is deficient in several respects. First, it covers only
a financial interest "in a party,' 1 69 but fails to address whether or not
class members and putative class members are to be considered
164. See H.R. Rep. 93-1453, at 1-2 (1974).
165. See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988);
In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925, 926-27 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Va. Elec. and Power
Co., 539 F.2d 357, 367 (4th Cir. 1976); In re IPO, 174 F. Supp. 2d 70, 88 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); Alaska Oil Co. v. Alaska, 45 B.R. 358, 360 (D. Alaska 1985); LeRoy v. City of
Houston, 592 F. Supp. 415, 418-19 (S.D. Tex. 1984); Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Mo. v.
Missouri, 438 F. Supp. 830, 835 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2000). For a discussion of the knowledge
requirement of this provision, see supra Part I.C.3 and notes 94-95 and accompanying
text.
167. The judge would need to suspend involvement in the case until the stock was
sold. See supra note 122.
168. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
169. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(f).
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parties. Second, subsection (f) does not contemplate the scenario in
which a judge or a family member's current or prior stock ownership
qualifies him or her as a class member or putative class member.
Finally, the only family members mentioned are a spouse or minor
child in the judge's household, leaving out the possibility that the
conflict might belong to the judge's adult child or third-degree
relative. 17 Conspicuously, because of subsection (f)'s deficiencies,
cases decided since its enactment have had to grapple with some of
the same questions as cases decided pre-amendment.171 Congress has
yet to engage these questions by revisiting the statute.
1. The Special Problems of Class Actions
The complex nature of class actions creates unique challenges in the
area of judicial disqualification. 7 The source of the challenge is the
difficulty in determining what constitutes a cognizable interest in the
outcome of this kind of suit.'73 A typical class action may involve a
large class of public corporations. 7 4 The judge or a family member
170. Id.
171. Compare Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025 (5th Cir. 1998), and In re
IPO, 174 F. Supp. 2d 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (post-amendment cases), with Union
Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Serv., Inc., 782 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1986), and In re
Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982) (pre-amendment cases).
172. Both plaintiffs and defendants may be certified as a class; however, the
majority of class actions involve plaintiff classes. Moore's Federal Practice: Manual
for Complex Litigation (Third) § 25.4 (2000) [hereinafter Manual for Complex
Litigation]. Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for three
types of class actions. The first, known as a (b)(1) class action, is used in situations
where individual suits would give rise to incompatible standards of conduct for the
opposing party or impair, as a practical matter, the rights or interests of other
members who were not parties to the suits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). The second
type, a (b)(2) class action, is directed toward class injunctive or declaratory relief. Id.
at 23(b)(2). The third type of class action falls under subsection (b)(3). Here, the
relationship between the individual members is attenuated except that common
questions of law or fact predominate over any others, and the court deems a class
action the fairest and most efficient adjudication of the claims. Id. at 23(b)(3); see also
Silberman, supra note 16, at 202. In (b)(3) class actions only, individual class
members must be given notice and opportunity to opt out of the class, so a class list
must be created. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). For the purposes of this Note, it does
not matter which type of class action is involved, only that the nature of the judge or
family member's interest is financial (though the financial interest problem is more
likely to arise in (b)(3) class actions). When the judge or family member's interest
makes him or her a class member or potential class member, courts distinguish
between classes where a financial interest is at stake (possibly requiring
disqualification) and other classes such as civil rights classes (where disqualification is
generally not required). See In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925, 928-29 (5th Cir.
1984) (holding that per se rule did not apply to judge who was a class member in
voting rights case because her interest was non-pecuniary and the same as that of all
members of the local public); Abramson, supra note 96, at 1069-77.
173. See Boniface, supra note 16, at 1294.
174. Id.
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might own a small amount of stock in one or more of those
corporations. 1 5 The number of companies involved in the suit
magnifies the potential for the existence of some conflicting financial
interest, however small, within the judge's family. The potential loss
or benefit is also likely to be small, as recovery for individual class
members is often minimal. 76
A paltry interest can be exploited as a litigation tactic. The
conflicting interest is sometimes discovered by counsel after assiduous
probing of the judge's financial records.177 If even one plaintiff or
defendant out of many in the suit moves for disqualification, the
entire case must stop in its tracks until the judge can decide the
motion. 178 A petition for review may follow if the judge denies the
motion,179 which further delays adjudication of the claims.' 80
The myriad of potential class members and the relatively small
sums at stake for the judge creates the specter of recusal becoming the
rule rather than the exception. As the Supreme Court has noted,
With the proliferation of class actions involving broadly defined
classes, the application of the constitutional requirement of
disqualification must be carefully limited. Otherwise constitutional
disqualification arguments could quickly become a standard feature
of class-action litigation.... At some point, the biasing influence...
will be too remote and insubstantial to violate the constitutional
constraints.181
In order to keep the incidence of disqualification in such cases in
175. Id.
176. Accordingly, where no recovery is sought for individual class members,
recusal is not warranted. See Christiansen v. Nat'l Sav. and Trust Co., 683 F.2d 520,
526 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
177. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing financial disclosure by judges); see also In re
Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1982) (several defendants
advised judge that they had discovered his wife owned stock in seven of 210,235 class
members); Black v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 503 F. Supp. 172, 173 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (despite
defendants' awareness of possible grounds for disqualification motion from the
outset, they waited until just before trial when "intense settlement negotiations" were
underway to make the motion).
178. See In re Cement, 688 F.2d at 1300; In re IPO, 174 F. Supp. 2d 70, 72 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (thirty-eight defendant underwriters out of more than 1000 defendants moved
for judge's recusal).
179. An order denying a motion to recuse is interlocutory and, therefore, not
immediately appealable. 3-23 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Manual: Federal
Practice and Procedure § 23.34(5)(b) (3d ed. 2002). Most circuit courts, however,
allow parties to challenge a district judge's denial of a recusal motion by seeking a
writ of mandamus. Id. Nevertheless, because recusal decisions are evaluated by the
deferential abuse of discretion standard, it is rare for the circuit court to grant the
writ. Id.
180. The challenged judge may not rule on any futher motions while the appeal is
pending. See Flamm, supra note 20, § 22.1.
181. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 826 (1986) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
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check, and to provide judges facing these motions with a firmer basis
for decision, the statute must establish clearer and more realistic
standards than does the current § 455.
2. Who Is a "Party"?

One of the most conspicuous problems in determining whether the
judge must recuse herself from a class action is whether the judge's
financial interest qualifies her as a "party." A party is one by or

against whom a lawsuit is brought. 18 2 In a regular case, identifying the
parties is simple; a mere look at the pleadings will answer the

question. In a class action, however, the question becomes somewhat
complicated.1

3

1

The class consists of named representatives who

litigate claims on behalf of the class, as well as any number of
unnamed, or absent, class members.)" Ascertaining exactly who
belongs to that group often takes significant time.1 15 First, the class
must be defined; second, it must be certified; and third, its members
must be identified.'86 Because of the potentially high stakes the
unified suit will present for the opposing parties, the decision to
certify a class demands serious judicial consideration, including a
hearing and discovery. 87 Before the class list is compiled, it will
sometimes be hard to identify who will be in the class. 8
In other cases, the judge might be able to identify potential, or
putative, class members in advance of certification.' 89 The problem
182. Black's Law Dictionary 917 (7th ed. 2000).
183. If an action is filed as a class action, or even styled as one without expressly
saying so, the court must treat it as one until it has determined otherwise. See Bing v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 446 (5th Cir. 1973); Manual for Complex
Litigation, supra note 172, § 30.11.
184. See Fed. Rule Civ. P. 23(a).
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Id.
185. See supra note 15.
186. See Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 172, §§ 30-30.23. A class list is
necessary in a (b)(3) class action, where the Rule mandates notice and opportunity to
opt out; Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) do not have these requirements, but a court may
impose them in some cases. Id. § 30.14.
187. See id. §§ 30.12-30.13. "The decision on whether or not to certify a class,
therefore, can be as important as decisions on the merits of the action and should be
made only after consideration of all relevant evidence and arguments presented by
the parties." Id. § 30.1. The Rules call for certification "as soon as practicable." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
188. See supra notes 15,113.
189. See, e.g., Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025, 1027 (5th Cir. 1998);
MDCM Holdings, Inc. v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 205 F. Supp. 2d 158, 160-62
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remains, though, that the status of putative class members is not clear
under § 455, which uses only the term "party."' 190 The judge might be
alerted to the fact that she or her family member is a potential class
member, or holds an interest in a potential class member, but will find
no guidance in the statute as to whether she must recuse on this basis.
Most courts have held that a putative class member does not
constitute a party.1 91 Their reasoning is that the interest of putative
class members is too speculative, dependent as it is on possible
certification of the class at some future date. In LeRoy v. City of
Houston, the district court encapsulated this approach: "Certification
would be a meaningless step if all entities whom a named plaintiff
sought to represent were constrained by the mere filing of the action.
The interests of a potential member of a class are too 'uncertain' to
justify holding those potential members to be parties under § 455. '' 192
Without conceding that members of a certified class would be
considered parties, the judge in this voting rights case saw a danger in
placing the bar for classification as a "party" so low as to include
someone who was perhaps "briefly over a decade ago within the
putative class."' 193 This approach assumes that not every putative class
member will end up part of a certified class, either because he or she
turns out to be excluded by the class definition, or because the court
ultimately denies class certification.
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Tramonte v. Chrysler held that
where the judge, her spouse, or minor child in the household is a
putative class member, "there exists a financial interest in the case
mandating recusal under § 455 (b)(4)."' 194 On the other hand, the
court also stated that if an interest is held by the judge's third-degree
relatives, for example, making them putative class members, they are
not parties under subsection (b)(5), and the judge need only consider
whether there is any appearance of partiality requiring recusal under
subsection (a). 95 The court expressed its rationale this way:
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
190. A judge is disqualified where "[h]e knows that he ... or his spouse or minor
child.., has a financial interest.., in a party," 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2000), or "[h]e

or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship... [i]s a party." Id. §
455(b)(5)(i) (emphasis added).
191. See New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 719 F.2d 733, 735
(5th Cir. 1983); MDCM Holdings, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 161; LeRoy v. City of Houston,
592 F. Supp. 415, 419 (S.D. Tex. 1984); United States v. Alabama, 582 F. Supp. 1197,
t203, 1208 (N.D. Ala. 1984); see also Palais Royal, Inc. v. Partida, 916 S.W.2d 650, 653
(Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
192. LeRoy, 592 F. Supp. at 419.
193. Id. at 420. The class definition must specify a time period during which one
had to have met the relevant criteria in order to be a member of the class. See Manual
for Complex Litigation, supra note 172, § 30.14.
194. Tramonte, 136 F.3d at 1030.
195. Id. at 1030-31.
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The fact that a class has not yet been certified unquestionably
diminishes the expected value of the outcome of the litigation to the
interested judge, as it makes a financial recovery less certain. Yet
recovery in any matter that has not reached a final judgment is
uncertain; otherwise, there would be no case or controversy.
Because § 455(b)(4) requires recusal for even paltry financial
interests, the increased uncertainty of recovery in the
precertification stage of a class action affects the size but not the
existence of a disqualifying financial interest. The decision on a
request to certify is itself a critical step, often with large financial
consequences. An assertion that a member of a putative class lacks
a financial interest relevant to the trial
court's decision until after
96
the class is certified blinks at reality.
This approach essentially sidesteps the question of whether a
financial interest in a putative class member is a financial interest in a
party under subsection (b)(4).
The court concludes without
explanation that such an interest is always an interest in "the subject
matter in controversy," rather than considering that it might instead
be classified as "any other interest" in the "outcome of the
proceeding."' 97 If it is the latter, it would be subject to the per se
disqualification rule only if the potential impact of the outcome is
substantial."' If the interest in the putative class member could not be
substantially affected by the outcome, subsection (b)(4) would allow
the judge to continue to preside. Indeed, the financial interest of
putative class members, and even more so the interest of one who
merely possesses an interest in a putative class member, will often be
196. Id. at 1030. One rationale for this view is that a settlement agreement
conditioned on class certification sometimes occurs before a formal ruling on the
class. See 2 Newberg & Conte, supra note 16, §§ 11.09, 11.22, 11.27. In this situation,
certification will simultaneously dispose of the case. In a sense, that contingency puts
the interest of putative class members on par with the interest of members of a
certified class.
197. Tramonte, 136 F.3d at 1030; see also In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925, 92829 n.6 (5th Cir. 1984) ("The issue is not before us whether a member of a class is a
party where the interest involved is pecuniary. Yet we doubt that the question need
ever be reached, since where the interest is pecuniary the judge will be disqualified
under the per se rule ....
").But see In re IPO, 174 F. Supp. 2d 70, 91 n.32 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), where the court noted:
Whether this Court actually had a 'legal or equitable interest' at such an
early stage might be disputed given that bare expectancies usually have little
weight in the law. Second, the phrase 'subject matter in controversy' might
not extend to class actions. As one judge complained: 'I find the term
"subject matter in controversy" to be inherently vague.... While it
obviously applies to in rem proceedings, Congress has not indicated whether
it is limited to such proceedings and, if it is not, how far the term extends.'
Id. For a discussion of the definitions of these terms, see supra Part I.B.2.
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2000); In re IPO, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 91-92; Gordon
v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1045 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (suggesting this
view).
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inconsequential, and therefore the substantiality-of-the-potentialimpact approach may be the more appropriate.
A judge who, after class certification, discovers a financial interest
in an absent class member will similarly not find § 455 very instructive.
The status of absent class members in a certified class remains
unspecified in the statute, which refers only to a "party."' 99 Lacking
any insight into Congress's intent,200 most courts have assumed that

absent class members do have the status of parties, 201 at least for the

limited purposes of § 455. 2 The rationale is that "class members and
parties are treated in substantially the same manner in regard to the
substantive benefits and burdens of judgment. ' 20 3 It is true that, in
some respects, absent class members resemble parties: Unless they

have opted out, they are included in the judgment and bound for res
judicata purposes; they may appeal from an order approving a
settlement; and in diversity cases brought under Rule 23(b)(3), 2 4 each
class member must satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.2 5
In other ways, however, the treatment of absent class members differs
significantly from that of parties: For diversity jurisdiction, only the
class representatives need be diverse from the opposing parties; some

courts have held that class members are not subject to discovery;
other courts have held that class members should not be treated as
parties for purposes of counterclaims. 20 6 Absent class members also

199. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
200. See In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litig., 515 F. Supp. 1076, 1079 (D.
Ariz. 1981) ("Despite the proliferation of class-actions in this country, there is no
indication that Congress directly considered the question whether 'party' under (b)(4)
should be read to include 'class member."').
201. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 719 F.2d 733,
735 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1310 (9th Cir. 1982);
MDCM Holdings, Inc. v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 205 F. Supp. 2d 158, 161
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("'Of course, if the class were already certified and it included this
Court, the Court would be [a] 'party to the proceeding."' (internal citations omitted));
LeRoy v. Houston, 592 F. Supp. 415, 419 (S.D. Tex. 1984); see also Judges' Duty to
Inquire When Relatives May Be Members of Class Action, 2 Advisory Op. U.S.
Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct No. 90 (1998), available at
www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/90.html.
202. See In re Cement, 688 F.2d at 1310.
We need not decide the general question of whether class members are in
fact "parties" to a class action suit; for some purposes they are treated as
such, and for other purposes they are not. Here, we need decide only if, for
purposes of section 455, stock ownership in a class member constitutes an
interest in "a party to the proceeding."
Id.
203. Id. at 1309.
204. Fed. Rule Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
205. See In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925, 929 n.7 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing cases);
In re Cement, 688 F.2d at 1309-10 (same).
206. See In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d at 929 n.7 (citing cases); In re Cement, 688
F.2d at 1309-10 (same); see also 1 Newberg & Conte, supra note 16, § 1.03.
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differ from parties in that they play no active role and have no input in
the litigation of the case.2 °7 Further, the amount of money at stake for
individual class members, as well as the potential effect on a financial
interest in a class member, is likely to be much smaller than in a
regular case because the judgment is diffuse among such a large
number of entities.2 8
Either way, for practical purposes in adjudicating disqualification
motions, it seems illogical to have different rules for putative class
members and members of a certified class. If the issue is raised early
on, when there is only a putative class, then according to the majority
of courts, a judge who is a putative class member or who owns stock in
one would not be required to recuse herself. However, if the issue is
raised after the subsequent certification of the class, most courts
would require the judge's disqualification. And yet recusal at that
later stage, assuming no divestiture, would be that much more costly
and disruptive.2 "9 A uniform rule avoids making the timing of the
motion, rather than the existence of a stake in the litigation, the
decisive factor.
3. When Can Divesting Cure the Conflict?
Consider a judge who discovers that she owns stock in a member of
the class in a class action pending before her, and wishes to sell the
shares in order to avoid recusal. Subsection (f) permits divestiture of
a financial interest in a 2party discovered after the expenditure of
"substantial judicial time.. .. The judge would first need to examine,
then, whether this criterion is satisfied. If it is, neither the fact of the
prior stock holding nor the divestment itself would be subject to the
appearance of bias test of subsection (a); rather, the option to divest
would be available only if the interest were not one that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. 1' The
question remains, however, whether this provision for cure by
divesting is an exclusive one-available only under the circumstances
described in subsection (f)-or whether the judge's sale of a
conflicting stock interest early in the case, subject to subsection (a),
207. See supra note 184; infra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., In re Cement, 688 F.2d at 1313 (judge's wife had a maximum of $29.70

at stake).
209. Notably, in reaching its holding, the Ninth Circuit in In re Cement remarked:
"[N]or would we necessarily agree that there is no logical or rational basis for drawing
a distinction between ordinary civil cases and class actions for purposes of enacting

appropriate statutory recusal provisions ....
[T]he application of section 455 to class
actions creates substantial administrative burdens ...."Id. at 1310 n.14.
210. 28 U.S.C. § 455(f) (2000). This discussion assumes, arguendo,the position that
an absent class member is considered a party.
211. Id.; see also supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
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eliminates the need for recusal. Put another way, does the subsection
(b) per se rule preclude divestiture as a remedy, or merely proscribe a
judge's participation in a case when she has knowledge of an existing
financial interest? Courts facing this scenario have reached opposing
conclusions both before and after the adoption of subsection (f).
In Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Service,2 ' the Seventh
Circuit held that because the judge had made no rulings between the
date she discovered her husband's stock interest and the date of
divestment,2 13 she did not violate subsection (b)(4):
Since the statute forbids only the knowing possession of a financial
interest, since Judge Getzendanner relinquished control of the case
as soon as she found out about the financial interest, and since she
did not resume control until the financial interest was eliminated, at
no time was she in literal violation of the statute.
... Before she discovered she had a financial interest, she could

have had no incentive to favor the plaintiffs; when she knew she had
such an interest, she made no rulings in the case; now, when she has
no interest, she cannot enrich herself by favoring the plaintiffs. The
statutory
purpose would not be served by forcing her to recuse
2 14

herself.

The court also considered whether divestment in this case had
created any appearance of partiality under § 455(a), and concluded
that it had not. 215 Although the judge's husband paid $900 in
212. 782 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1986).
213. "Although the case was not formally reassigned to another judge, any matters
requiring a judicial ruling were referred to other judges; it was as if she had recused
herself." Id. at 714; accord Removal of Disqualification by Disposal of Interest, 2
Advisory Op. U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct No. 69 (1998),
availableat www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/69.html.
Accordingly, if a judge learns of a disqualifying financial interest in a party
before expending judicial time on the case, the judge may avoid
disqualification by divesting himself or herself of the interest. Since in this
situation, a judge could in any event recuse, divest and then have the matter
reassigned to the judge, the Committee has concluded that.., any other
interpretation would require the judge to do a futile act.
Id.

214. Union Carbide, 782 F.2d at 714. Because almost five years had passed
between the time the suit was assigned to Judge Getzendanner and the time she
discovered the conflicting interests, this case would have warranted the application of
subsection (f) of § 455 had it been in effect at that time. The court, however, did not
base its holding permitting divestment on the advanced stage of the litigation. The
district court, in denying the recusal motion, had distinguished this case from In re
Cement, in which the judge was forced to recuse after more than three years based on
his wife's stock holdings. See In re Indus. Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 80-C-3479, 1985
WL 2869, *2 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 1985) (discussing In re Cement). The In re Cement
court did not even discuss the divestiture issue, apparently because the judge's wife
had declined to sell the stocks. In re Cement, 688 F.2d 1297; see also supra note 70.
215. Union Carbide,782 F.2d at 715.
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brokerage fees to sell the stock and gave up the chance for future
appreciation, the court held that, under the circumstances, this
volitional act did not create "the slightest indication that [the judge]
'
has in fact any partiality in this matter."2 16
One judge dissented,
arguing that § 455(b) "is absolute in language and contains no
'
provision for cure."217
The majority's approach, he asserted, "engrafts
the once-vanquished substantiality standard onto [§ 455(b)] via
section 455(a)."2 1
Fifteen years later-and thirteen years after the enactment of
subsection (f)-the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York in In re IP021 9 employed substantially the same logic as the
Seventh Circuit in Union Carbide. In denying a disqualification
motion filed only a few months after more than 1000 consolidated
class actions had come before the judge, Judge Scheindlin marshaled a
host of historical sources to illustrate the proposition that "prospective
cure" by divestment-selling a conflicting interest at the outset of a
case, before any substantive rulings had been issued-had always
been so widely accepted as permissible that it did not merit specific
mention in the statute.22 The Second Circuit upheld this ruling,22" ' but
made no findings on the district court's analysis of subsection (b). 222
Instead, the court determined that subsection (f) was applicable
because of the level of managerial and administrative effort the court
had invested in the case, albeit in a short period of time.223 The
Second Circuit's discussion of subsection (f), however, suggests that it
views that provision as the exclusive province of the divestment
216. Id. at 716. The judge's husband incurred no capital gains tax because he had a
tax-free account; he put the proceeds into the money market, suggesting that he may
have wanted to get out of the stock market anyway. Id. at 713, 716. The court also
believed the $900 brokerage fee to be too small to warrant a reasonable person to
question the judge's impartiality in the case. Id. at 716. "It is one thing to assume that
judges are human beings with the usual human emotions and another to attribute to
them a malevolent, a calculating, vindictiveness." Id.
217. Id. at 717 (Flaum, J., dissenting). The argument is that disqualification
attaches immediately at the moment that the interest comes to light. Id.
218. Id. at 718.
219. 174 F. Supp. 2d 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
220. Id. at 72, 80-87; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing role
of assumption about possibility of divesting insubstantial interests as one rationale for
enacting per se rule). According to the court, once a judge had made substantive
rulings, such as was the case in In re Cement, divestment would no longer avail as a
cure because there would be no way to retroactively repair the impropriety. In re
IPO, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 86-87. However, it would seem that if the judge was unaware
of the conflicting interest at the time she issued the rulings, there would be no
violation of the statute and no ground for questioning the judge's impartiality. Where
the judge or her family member is willing to divest upon learning of the conflict, such
a move would cure prospectively the violation that would otherwise arise at that point.
221. See In re Certain Underwriter, 294 F.3d 297, 303-04 (2d Cir. 2002).
222. Id.
223. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit, in Tramonte v. Chrysler,225 reached the opposite
conclusion from the district court in In re IPO. The court held that
subsection (f) signified the sole provision for curing a financial
interest, and that where it was inapplicable, divestiture was not an
option for avoiding disqualification. 226 The court adopted the view of
the dissent in Union Carbide, asserting that Congress had based
subsection (f) in part on that position.227 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit
has held that "the existence of section 455(f) suggests that Congress
intended to exclude the types of cure not permitted by this
provision,2 28 for Congress had the opportunity to enact a broader
amendment than it devised with section 455(f). ' 229 This argument, of
course, goes to the interpretation of the existing statute rather than
the merits of allowing judges to divest of financial interests.
Interestingly, several cases reading subsection (f) to deny a motion
for disqualification have indicated that the divestiture of the interest
cures any possible conflict, rather than focusing on the expenditure of
substantial time as the operative rationale. 2 ° This emphasis reveals an
essential truth about minor financial interests: In the majority of cases,
they can be cleanly eliminated, leaving no trace of bias nor any
appearance of partiality.

224. The Second Circuit stated:
The case before us falls squarely within the situation envisioned by
Congress-a district judge with a minor interest in a class action lawsuit
discovered after assignment, who quickly divested herself of the conflicting
interest. Congress clearly did not envision class membership as an interest
"substantially affected by the outcome," otherwise § 455(f) could not solve
the very problem it was meant to remedy.
Id. at 304.
The Second Circuit's decision, however, was at odds with its reasoning, since
the judge had other conflicts not contemplated by the "interest in a party" language
of subsection (f): She herself had been a putative class member, and her adult son had
owned stock in a party that made him a putative class member as well. Both Judge
Scheindlin and her son had divested of their interests and waived class membership.
See In re IPO, 174 F. Supp. 2d 70, 77-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The circuit court did not
address these issues.
225. 136 F.3d 1025 (5th Cir. 1998).
226. Id. at 1031.
227. Id.; see supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
228. For instance, subsection (f) excludes situations where "substantial judicial
time" has not been expended, or the interest is one that "could be substantially
affected by the outcome." 28 U.S.C. § 455(f) (2000).
229. In re Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136,1147 (6th Cir. 1990).
230. See, e.g., Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Maxus Energy Corp., 925 F.2d 556, 561 (2d
Cir. 1991); Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., No. 87 Civ. 0150, 2000 WL
1585078, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2000) ("Any conceivable impartiality was cured
when this Court divested its interest in The Chase Manhattan Corporation, pursuant
to § 455(f)"); Perpich v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 927 F. Supp. 226, 231-32 (E.D.
Mich. 1996).
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B. An Aborted Step Toward Reform
The judiciary is not alone in noting the uncertainties regarding class
membership under 28 U.S.C. § 455. In 1985, Congressman Robert
Kastenmeier proposed adding a new provision to § 455 to delineate
the status of absent class members. 23 His proposal read:
For purposes of this section, an absent class member in a class action
shall not be considered to be a party or to have a financial interest in
the subject matter in controversy, but shall be considered to be a
person with an interest that could be affected by the outcome of the
proceeding.232
Under this categorization, a judge in a given case would evaluate
whether her interest as an absent class member stood to be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.2 33
Congressman Kastenmeier's proposal met with criticism from the
Office of Legal Policy of the U.S. Department of Justice.234 In a letter
to the House Judiciary Committee, the Justice Department raised
several objections.2 35 First, the Department expressed concern that
"[e]ven if a judge's potential gain or loss from the outcome of a case is
slight, adversely affected parties may feel or allege that a judge would
identify psychologically with the interest of enterprises in which he or
his family have a significant investment. '23 6 The Justice Department
also objected to having different
standards for absent class members
23 7
and named class representatives.
Finally, the Justice Department raised concerns about the
application of the proposed subsection to other parts of the statute
using the word "party," namely subsection (b)(1), which disqualifies a
judge for "personal bias or prejudice concerning a party," and
subsection (d)(4), which defines a financial interest to include a
position as "director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs
of a party.""23 Since these subsections would now be read not to
include class members, a judge might have bias or prejudice
concerning a class member, or she or her family member might serve
231. See H.R. 3044, 99th Cong. (1985).
Congressman Kastenmeier, a
representative from Wisconsin, chaired the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee. Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice, 99th Cong. 112-17
(1985).
232. H.R. 3044, 99th Cong. (1985).
233. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), (5)(iii) (2000).
234. See Letter of Assistant Attorney General Spears, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,and the Admin. ofJustice, supra note 231, at app.
II.
235. Id. at 113-17.
236. Id. at 114.
237. See id.
238. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4)).
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as a "director, advisor, or other active participant in the affairs of" a
class member, and the judge would still not be disqualified under the
respective subsections.23 9
Due to the objections raised to
Congressman Kastenmeier's proposal, it failed to be enacted and has
languished ever since. The problems in this area of the law, however,
have persisted. The next part of this Note proposes possible solutions
to these problems in the form of amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 455.
III. PROPOSING AMENDMENT
Deficiencies in the current 28 U.S.C. § 455 and the resulting
confusion in the caselaw have created a need for amendment. There
are, in addition, other policy reasons for amending the statute. This
part of the Note discusses those policy reasons, and also analogizes
financial interest cases to other types of conflicts where the statute
affords judges more discretion.
The part then proposes two
amendments. First, it offers a modified version of Congressman
Kastenmeier's proposal to define the status of absent and putative
class members. Second, it proposes several changes to the current
subsection (f) in order to make divestment a more widely available
remedy. The part then addresses potential arguments against the
proposals. Finally, the part illustrates how the hypothetical scenarios
which began this Note would be resolved under the amended § 455.
The law of judicial disqualification must keep pace with the times or
risk losing its claims to both fairness and efficiency.240 The proposed
amendments seek to achieve a better balance between these
competing goals.
A. More Reasons for Reform
The lack of consistency in the way courts have construed § 455namely, with regard to the status of putative and absent class
members and the permissibility of curing financial interests by
divesting-reveals a serious need for Congress to clarify the statute
via amendment.
There are, in addition, other reasons that
amendment is in order, particularly as a means of injecting more
flexibility into the statute.
The interpretation of the current § 455 that has been adopted by
some courts has several damaging effects. First, holding that every
class member is a party and therefore that even a small financial
interest in a class member (or of a class member) is automatically
disqualifying, and that divestiture is not permitted to cure the conflict

239. Id. at 114-15.
240. See supra Part I.A. Indeed, it is in the nature of every balancing test to require
continual adjustment.
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except if some indefinite amount of time has been clocked, creates the
likelihood of frequent, almost routine, disqualifications, particularly in
large class actions involving hundreds or thousands of companies.4
Such disqualifications come at a great cost in time, money, effort, and
efficiency to the system and to the opposing parties in these cases,
especially in smaller or more rural districts.242
Second, this interpretation of the statute effectively limits the pool
of judges able to hear such cases to non-investors with less knowledge
2 43

of and experience in the subject matter of the cases before them.

Of

241. "With the proliferation of class actions involving broadly defined classes, the
application of the constitutional requirement of disqualification must be carefully
limited." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 826 (1986). "Prudence might
therefore require, if Union Carbide's position on recusal of Judge Getzendanner were
sustained, that all judges owning securities of individual companies recuse themselves
from any class action in which the plaintiff class included companies." Union Carbide
Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Serv., Inc., 782 F.2d 710, 714-15 (7th Cir. 1986); see also In re
Cabletron Sys., Inc. 311 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2002) (securities class action requiring
recusal of four judges).
242.
The court notes that each of the other judges in this district are fully
occupied with heavy dockets, and geographically are located a minimum of
100 miles from the situs of the Covington division. Therefore, finding a
replacement judge would be difficult and impede efficient judicial
administration.... [I]f the motion is granted, it will have the effect of
denying the opposing parties the reasonably prompt day in court to which
they are entitled.
Black v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 503 F. Supp. 172, 174 (E.D. Ky. 1980). "Also, other costs
must be considered.... Reassignment ... would cause great inconvenience to the
counsel, parties, or judge, particularly if the litigation takes several years to
complete." In re N.M. Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 620 F.2d 794, 797 (10th Cir. 1980);
see also Bloom, supra note 27, at 700 ("The [per se disqualification] rule is not only
inflexible, but ignores the important concerns of avoiding waste of judicial resources
and preventing unnecessary delays in litigation.").
One commentator has pointed out an additional problem the rule creates on
the circuit court level:
The rule ... hampers administration of the federal judicial system by hindering the
ability of the courts of appeals to conduct en banc reviews of panel decisions. En
banc reviews are difficult in many circuits because the per se rule frequently
disqualifies so many circuit judges that not enough remain to grant a rehearing.
See Bloom, supra note 27, at 700.
243.
To hold that Judge Getzendanner is violating section 455(b) might have the practical
effect... of disqualifying from presiding over class actions a large fraction of the
federal judges in the United States.... Class action judges would be drawn from the
subset of judges that happen not to own such securities.
Union Carbide, 782 F.2d at 714-15. Commentators, too, have recognized this risk:
The other side of the constitutional argument is that limiting the pool of
available judges actually restricts effective due process:
The impact of recusals on the large corporation is both obvious and subtle.
Obviously, recusals limit the pool of judges available to hear a case. The
stricter the ethical standards, the more recusals and the smaller the pool of
judges. More subtly, some recusals affect the type of judge left in the pool.
For example, recusal standards which penalize intelligent investors.. . may
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course, just because a judge does not invest in the stock market does
not mean she is any less smart or capable than one who is a financial
wizard. But even if interpreting the statute this way is not a problem
in individual cases, it cumulatively creates a situation where all the
caselaw on, for example, securities class actions, would be written by
non-investors.2 4
Finally, the rigid application of the per se rule places a
disproportionate emphasis on a judge's financial ties, and often
produces anomalous, logically inconsistent outcomes.
While having a financial stake in a case may create a real conflict of
interest, money is by no means the only or most powerful influence
on people's judgment. As Winston Churchill noted, people are far
more likely to be corrupted by friendship than by anything else.
Frankly, most reasonable people might be relatively unconcerned
that Justice O'Connor would be influenced in her vote on a case by
how the court's decision might affect the value of a few shares of
stock that she owns, and far more concerned if she were voting to
grant or deny a petition that would bankrupt a close friend.
However, under the current standards, disqualification245in the former
is automatic and in the latter it is virtually unheard of.
Neither the legislative history of § 455 nor common sense justifies
treating all manner of financial interests with such exceptional rigidity.
Amending the statute will rein in the undesirable outcomes of its
application, while at the same time providing judges with a clearer
basis to determine when recusal is necessary and when it is not.

well eliminate the types of jurists most able to comprehend the position of
the large corporation.
Thus, the strict standard as applied to class actions which affect investors can
deny class member companies access to "as full, balanced and representative
a range of judges as is available to other small litigants."
Boniface, supra note 16, at 1303 (quoting Levy, supra note 22, at 36-37).
Disqualifying a judge not only removes someone found worthy by the
President and Senate; it also affects the overall mix of judges. Suppose one
thinks of the judiciary as representing, in a rough way, social groups. One
might then condemn some disqualification rules as undemocratically
eliminating one class of judges from certain cases.
Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at 270-71.
244. See supra note 243.
245. Bleich & Klaus, supra note 20, at 17-18; see also Bassett, supra note 4, at 124243 ("[A] dichotomy currently exists between financial and most non-financial
interests: any doubts about potential bias resulting from a financial interest are
resolved in favor of recusal, whereas any doubts about potential bias resulting from
most non-financial interests often tend to be resolved in favor of participating in the
case."); Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at 238 (giving examples of inconsistent outcomes
under the statute); Brian P. Leitch, Note, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal
Courts: A Proposalto Conform Statutory Provisions to Underlying Policies, 67 Iowa
L. Rev. 525, 527 (1982) ("Under the current law, judicial disqualification may be
required when no reasonable person would doubt a judge's impartiality.").
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B. Room for Comparison?
An examination of other types of judicial conflict cases where
disqualification is not automatic makes clear not only that the current
state of the law creates uneven standards, but that in other contexts
judges are entrusted with discretion to decide whether recusal is
required and are generally deemed well able to do so. Many types of
personal or political attachments do not subject the judge to per se
disqualification. For example, Catholic judges are not automatically
disqualified from death penalty or abortion rights cases,246 nor are
women judges from sex discrimination suits,2 47 black judges from race
discrimination suits,2 48 Asian judges from cases involving prominent
Asian-American parties,2 49 homosexual judges from sexual orientation
discrimination cases,"' or Jewish judges from cases involving
allegations of anti-Semitic or anti-Israel motive."'
In fact, any
suggestion that the judge should be per se ineligible to preside is often
seen as offensive, impugning the judge's ability to put aside her own
views in order to fairly apply the law-which is ultimately what judges
must always do-and exploiting the judge's personal background for
strategic purposes.5 2
246. See generally Richard B. Saphire, Religion and Recusal, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 351
(1998). For an analysis of the issue of Catholic judges presiding over death penalty
cases, see John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81
Marq. L. Rev. 303 (1998).
247. See Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
248. See Paschall v. Mayone, 454 F. Supp. 1289, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that
a black judge's prior career as a civil rights advocate did not translate into
impartiality). For an eloquent discussion of the perils of using race or other personal
characteristics as the basis for disqualification, see Judge Higginbotham's opinion in
Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 155,
163-66, 180-81 (E.D. Pa. 1974). For further analysis of this case, see Margaret M.
Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys and the Straitjacket of
Legal Practice,95 Mich. L. Rev. 766, 775-78 (1997).
249. See MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equip. Fin., Inc., 138 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir.
1998).
250. See generally Malarkey, supra note 73.
251. See United States v. EI-Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. 955, 961-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
see also In re Disqualification of Fuerst, 674 N.E.2d 361, 362 (Ohio 1996) ("Absent a
specific demonstration of bias or prejudice or the existence of some other
disqualifying interest, I decline to adopt a general rule that mandates the
disqualification of a judge from a case involving a religious organization with which
the judge is affiliated.").
252. See MacDraw, 138 F.3d at 37-38. The court in MacDraw stated that
[a] suggestion that a judge cannot administer the law fairly because of the
judge's racial and ethnic heritage is extremely serious and should not be
made without a factual foundation going well beyond the judge's
membership in a particular racial or ethnic group. Such an accusation is a
charge that the judge is racially or ethnically biased and is violating the
judge's oath of office.
We do not hesitate to hold that the suggestions regarding Judge Chin's
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Another area of the law in which recusal is not automatically
required involves cases in which the judge owns stock in the victim of
a crime. 213 The few courts to have addressed this issue have agreed
that an interest in a crime victim is not an interest in a party or in the
subject matter of the proceeding. 4 Courts have instead analyzed the
substantiality of the interest, 255 and also applied the appearance of
partiality test of subsection (a) to determine whether the judge had to
recuse.256 For example, in United States v. Rogers,257 the district judge
held a "limited financial interest" in the Bank of America, the victim
of a mail fraud scheme assigned to the judge for sentencing. 258 The
Ninth Circuit applied the subsection (a) appearance of bias test, and
held that a reasonable person would not have questioned the judge's
impartiality. 259 A similar discretionary analysis is employed in cases
involving real estate where the judge owns adjacent property.2
Although financial interests are not quite the same as personal
conflicts based on a judge's background or experience, all grounds for
disqualification require the law to hypothesize about what might be
going on in a judge's mind as a result of particular factors. If the law
recognizes that a judge's sex, race, ethnicity, religion, and even certain
interests of the pocketbook should not automatically disqualify her
from a case, it can apply a similar approach to the interests of putative
or absent class members. Moreover, unlike immutable characteristics
such as sex and race, even an otherwise disqualifying financial interest
can be eliminated, if the judge or her family member elects to do so.
In most cases, divestment makes the need for recusal disappear. As
impartiality violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Id. (upholding district judge's imposition of sanctions for filing improper recusal
motion); see also El-Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. at 961-62.
253. See Andrew L. Wright, Comment, Invested in the Outcome: When the Judge
Owns Stock in the Victim of the Crime, 1998 U. Chi. Legal. F. 481, 481-87 (discussing
cases).
254. Id. at 481. But see United States v. Pappert, No. CRIM.-A.- 942001601, 1998
WL 596707, at *5 (D. Kan. July 29, 1998) (noting that if restitution is involved, the
judge would be considered to have an interest in the "subject matter of the
proceeding" if the defendant had not agreed to repay the funds before the trial
started).
255. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2000) (including as a disqualifier "any other interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding").
256. Wright, supra note 253, at 483-87. Some of the cases discussed in the
Comment were decided pre-1974, before subsection (a) had been adopted and when
the "substantial interest" test rather than the per se rule applied. An interest of
$10,000 has been said to give rise to a subsection (a) problem, id. at 485, while
holdings representing .0072% of a bank's 5,391,527 shares have been held to be too
minimal to require recusal, id. at 484 n.20.
257. 119 F.3d 1377 (9th Cir. 1997).
258. Id. at 1383-84.
259. Id. at 1383.
260. See Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1501-02 (9th Cir. 1987);
see also supra note 98 (discussing land claim cases).
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proposed in the following section, 28 U.S.C. § 455 should be amended
to broaden the availability of this remedy in financial interest cases.
C. ProposedChanges
This Note proposes a set of two amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 455.
The first, a revised version of Congressman Kastenmeier's proposal,
addresses the status of both absent and putative class members. The
second eliminates the need for disqualification based on financial
interests by allowing divestiture to cure the conflict in appropriate
cases.
1. Addressing Class Membership
With minor modification, Congressman Kastenmeier's proposal
delineating the status of absent class members 261 is worthy of
reconsideration. This Note proposes the following language for the
new provision:
For purposes of subsections (b)(4) and (b)(5), an absent or putative
class member in a class action shall not be considered to be a party
or to have a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy,
but shall be considered to be a person or entity with an interest that
could be affected by the outcome of the proceeding; a person with a
financial interest in an absent or putative class member in a class
action shall not be considered to have an interest in a party or in the
an
subject matter in controversy, but shall be considered to have
2 62
interest that could be affected by the outcome of the proceeding.
Under this approach, a putative or absent class member's interest, as
well as the interest of one owning shares in a putative or absent class
member, would be classified as "any other interest." The interest
or not the
would thus be evaluated in each case to determine whether
263
outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect it.
A uniform rule regarding putative and absent class members makes
sense because any other approach simply postpones the day of
reckoning as to the judge's possible disqualification until the moment
the class is certified."M It also makes sense to apply the same rule
whether the judge or family member has an interest in a company that
is a putative or absent class member, or is also-by virtue of her stock
ownership-herself a putative or absent class member. In either case,

261. See supra Part lI.B.
262. The italicized portions of the proposed provision denote alterations or
additions to Congressman Kastenmeier's 1985 proposal to amend 28 U.S.C. § 455. See
supra text accompanying note 232.
263. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), (5)(iii) (2000).
264. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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because of the peculiarities in the nature of class actions,265 the
interest is something less than an interest in, or of, a party. This
provision makes it unnecessary to decide across the board whether a
putative or absent class member is akin to a party; it makes clear that
the two are not, by definition, equivalent in the context of
disqualification decisions.266
The proposed provision does not distinguish between large and
small holdings, but rather focuses on the more relevant issue of how
much the judge or her family member stands to benefit or lose
depending on how the case comes out.26 7 For example, in In re
Cement, the judge's wife owned shares in seven of the 210,000 class
members valued at a total of $50,000, but she stood to gain or lose no
Still, the requisite
more than thirty dollars from the suit.268
appearance of partiality test of subsection (a) could occasionally turn
on the size of the holding. If the judge were a majority shareholder in
a putative or absent class member, she could not sit on the case even if
her interest did not stand to be substantially affected by the outcome
of the suit, as her doing so would create an appearance of bias.
Though the Justice Department, in critiquing Congressman
Kastenmeier's proposal, feared that the litigants on the opposing side
might feel that the judge would identify psychologically with the
companies in which she or her family were invested,2 69 the law does
not-and indeed should not-posture itself to accommodate such
speculation about a judge's inability to be impartial.27" Of course, the
situation would always need to be evaluated under subsection (a) to
determine whether it might give rise to an appearance of bias. 27' But
even that test is based on reasonable assumptions rather than offhand
allegations.2 72
The Justice Department also objected to distinguishing between
absent class members and named class representatives. 3 However,
while both share equally in the judgment, only the named class
265. See supra Parts II.A.1, 2.
266. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text; see also 1 Newberg & Conti,
supra note 16, § 1.04 (noting that absent class members are parties for some purposes
but not for others).
267. See Leitch, supra note 245, at 532 (discussing why the extent to which the
outcome would affect the interest, rather than the size of the interest, should be the
focus of the inquiry into the court's impartiality).
268. In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litig., 515 F. Supp. 1076, 1080, 1083 (D.
Ariz. 1981).
269. Id.
270. See supra notes 76, 251-52 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 76, 89, 251-52 and accompanying text.
273. See Letter of Assistant Attorney General Spears, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice, supra note 231, at app.
II.
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representatives play an active role in the litigation. 4 An interest in a
named representative arguably creates an appearance of partiality
problem under subsection (a). The named representative acts as a
traditional plaintiff or defendant party in a non-class action case.275
From a conceptual standpoint, allowing a judge to preside while
possessing a financial interest, even an inconsequential one, in a class
representative named in the lawsuit's caption seems as improper as
permitting a judge to sit on a non-class action case in which she owns
stock in a party, a position the statutory scheme has long since
rejected.276
Finally, the Justice Department's concern about the application of
the new provision to other parts of the statute using the word
"party"-subsection (b)(1), which disqualifies a judge for "personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party," and subsection (d)(4), which
defines a financial interest to include a position as "director, adviser,
or other active participant in the affairs of a party"2 7 7 -is easily solved
by limiting the provision's reach to the use of the term "party" in
subsections (b)(4) and (b)(5).
2. A New Subsection (f)
This Note also proposes replacing the current subsection (f) with
the following provision:
Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, with the
exception of subsection (a), if any justice, judge, magistrate, or
bankruptcy judge to whom a matter has been assigned becomes
aware of a financial interest that would otherwise be disqualifying,
disqualification is not required if the justice, judge, magistrate judge,
or family member, as the case may be, before any further rulings are
of the
made with respect to the case, divests herself or himself
2 78
interest that provides the grounds for the disqualification.
This proposed amendment makes several changes to the existing
provision. First and most important, it permits voluntary divestment
as a cure for conflicts based on financial interests, regardless of the
stage of the litigation in which they are discovered. This change
eliminates the "substantial judicial time" prerequisite. Because the
divestiture of such holdings will remove any conflict of interest, the

274. See 1 Newberg & Conti, supra note 16, § 1.03 ("Absent class members occupy
a special, nontraditional status in litigation.").
275. In fact, the defendant in a class action may even propose a settlement with the
named class representative alone. Id. §§ 11.11, 11.13.
276. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
278. See supra text accompanying note 67 for the language of the current
subsection (f).
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"substantial judicial time" requirement is superfluous 279 and prevents
the viable remedy of divestiture from being applied more widely in
financial interest cases. 80 In addition, the vagueness of the phrase
"substantial judicial time" has effectively watered down the
significance of this criterion for subsection (f)'s application.28'
Permitting divestiture as a remedy is sound policy, especially in light
of the proliferation of class action suits: It increases judicial and
administrative efficiency and economy, 22 and undercuts the incentives
of litigants seeking a ground to get rid of a judge they deem
unfavorable to them by unearthing evidence of some small interest.283
Second, the amended provision makes the cure of divestment
subject to the appearance of bias test of subsection (a). Under the
current subsection (f), a judge divesting after substantial judicial time
has been spent need not even examine whether the particular
circumstances give rise to an appearance problem. 284 However, as the
court in Union Carbide noted, in some cases in which divesting of the
interest results in unusually high fees, capital gains taxes, or other
detriment, that course of action might itself cause the judge's
impartiality to "reasonably be questioned" by an objective observer
with knowledge of the facts.285 This appearance problem could also
arise where the case has such notoriety or prestige that the judge
might have sold the stock despite substantial costs in order to remain
on the case. These scenarios would be the exception rather than the
rule, but the question merits consideration in all cases.286 Including
the subsection (a) analysis is consistent with the statute's primary
underlying values.
Third, the amendment eliminates the condition that the interest not
be one that "could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding." In most cases, divestment of a financial interest removes
any basis for the judge to favor one party over the other. In the
minority of cases in which the judge's financial stake stands to be so
substantially affected by the outcome-if, for example, she is a major
shareholder in a closely-held company-presiding over the case even
following sale of the shares would create an appearance of
impropriety, and divestment would not be permitted as a cure. To
divest of such an interest would mean forgoing a inordinately large
benefit or avoiding a tremendous detriment, and would therefore
279. See supra notes 214, 230 and accompanying text.
280. See supra Part II.A.3.
281. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 28-32, 177-81, 241-42 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 31-32, 43, 177-81 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. Of course, the higher the costs of
divestment, the less likely the judge or family is to elect that option.
286. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; supra Part I.C.1.
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imperil the judge's ability to be impartial. Using the subsection (a)
test better serves the interests of the justice system than the
"substantial impact of the outcome" test because the former considers
the appearance of fairness, a more inclusive rubric than actual
fairness.287
Fourth, the revised subsection removes the qualification that the
curable interest be a "financial interest in a party" held by the judge,
her spouse, or minor child residing in the household, and instead
makes the provision applicable to any "financial interest that would
otherwise be disqualifying." This change broadens the provision to
encompass situations in which the judge or her family member is
herself a putative or absent class member, or has a financial interest in
the subject matter of the proceeding or any other interest that could
be substantially affected, rather than an interest in a party.
Finally, the revised subsection expands the language to cover
interests held by any family member-not just the judge's spouse or
minor child, but also adult child, third-degree relative, spouse's thirddegree relative, or the spouse of one of these persons-whose putative
or absent class membership based on a financial interest would
otherwise disqualify the judge under subsections (b)(4) or (b)(5).
3. Addressing Possible Challenges
This section anticipates potential arguments that critics of this
Note's proposals might raise. First, it addresses the reasoning of the
Union Carbide dissent that permitting divestment of inconsequential
interests contravenes the 1974 per se rule. Second, it discusses the
belief that even divested interests may taint a judge's impartiality.
Third, it examines the effect the amendments might have on the
incidence of recusal motions. Finally, it looks at the potential
interplay between the new provisions and the integrity of the judicial
system.
Contrary to the contention of the dissenting judge in Union
Carbide,8 a rule evaluating the circumstances of a judge or family
member's divestment under the appearance of bias test of subsection
(a) does not mark a return to the pre-1974 substantiality test. 8 9 The
critical difference is this: Whereas the early rule permitted a judge to
sit on a case while in possession of a conflicting financial interest as
long as the interest was not substantial, the proposed rule would allow
only divestiture. The sole alternative would be recusal. The judge
could never sit on a case where she had a financial interest in the
subject matter of the proceeding or in a party without divesting.
287. See supra note 26.
288. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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The current § 455, as amended in 1974, does allow a judge to
preside without divesting in some circumstances where her interest is
classified under the "any other interest" category. This Note proposes
including a financial interest in or of a putative or absent class
member in that category. Under the "any other interest" standard, a
judge is required to recuse if, and only if, her interest could be
substantially affected by the outcome, or an appearance of partiality
would result from her continuing to preside.2 9"
Another frequent refrain is that possession of a financial interest
creates a bias in the judge's mind that perhaps even divestment cannot
cure.291 This argument proves too much. The law of judicial
disqualification carefully avoids assuming bias on the basis of mere
psychoanalytical speculation.292 A judge's sex, race, ethnicity, religion,
and personal background do not automatically render her unfit to
hear cases implicating those factors; 293 there is no reason to believe,
absent other facts particular to the case, that a judge's recent financial
holdings create a greater chance for bias. 94 Moreover, subsection (a)
is a safety valve for considering those case-specific facts where the
other provisions of the statute would not require recusal 95
One might further speculate that if litigants knew that a judge could
simply divest of a conflicting financial interest to avoid
disqualification, that might deter them from moving for the judge's
removal. If that is correct, it is not necessarily undesirable; it would
save time and money both for the court and the opposing party.
Attorneys, however, are unlikely to forsake en masse the
disqualification motion as a litigation tactic, particularly when they
discover a substantial financial interest. In these cases, divestment
would be unlikely and might also run afoul of subsection (a), leaving
recusal as the only alternative. As long as the judge is unaware of the
conflict, despite diligent efforts to monitor her portfolio, no statutory
violation and no possibility of bias exist. If the judge discovers the
interest sua sponte, she must either recuse or divest, but she cannot
keep silent.
Of course, in light of recently publicized findings,296 some might
argue that courts are already taking liberties with the disqualification
rules, and that they should not be granted any more freedom in this
area. The first proposed amendment, however, by clarifying the status
of absent and putative class members, will contribute to greater
290. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2000).
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

See Flamm, supra note 20, § 7.2.
See supra notes 76, 89 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
See supra note 39.
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consistency in the caselaw, not less.29 7 The second proposed
amendment, by permitting divestiture, will give judges who might
currently hide behind the knowledge requirement of subsection
(c)298-avoiding per se disqualification by staying a step behind in the
task of conflict-checking-a greater incentive to come clean about
conflicting financial interests by removing the inevitability of their per
se disqualification

from high-stakes, high-profile cases.299

It is

impossible for the system to "police" judges; only their own integrity
can ensure that the recusal statute, whatever its provisions, are
enforced.
D. Application of the ProposedProvisions

This section applies the proposed provisions for statutory
amendment to the four scenarios raised in the Introduction to this
Note. Such application demonstrates the consistent analysis obtained
in each of these cases which, under the present statute, are fraught
with uncertainties.
Judge A, who owns shares in W Corporation, a named party in a
suit pending before her, may choose to divest of the shares as soon as
she becomes aware of the conflict, provided the circumstances will not
297. See supra Part II.A.2. Further, the proposed characterization of class
membership as "an interest that could be affected by the outcome of the proceeding"
employs a sensible formula which is already part of subsection (b). Cf text of the first
suggested amendment, supra text accompanying note 262; 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4),
(5)(iii) (2000).
298. See supra Part I.C.3.
299. The CRC and Kansas City Star findings, detailed supra in note 39, reported
that many judges had adjudicated cases with financial conflicts which the judges
claimed had escaped their notice. While this scenario paints a disturbing picture, it
should also remind one that the judges' burden of conflict-checking is onerous. The
findings further raise the question of why the parties in those cases did not identify
and challenge the conflicts. One explanation for this is the difficulty attorneys face
obtaining judges' financial disclosure forms. See Testimony of Douglas T. Kendall,
CRC Executive Director, CRC Report, supra note 39. As Mr. Kendall testified,
[u]nlike the other two branches of government, which allow review and
duplication of financial disclosure forms on the same day they are requested,
the judiciary's Financial Disclosure Office notifies a judge in writing before
granting access to a financial disclosure report. This advance notification
seems contrary to the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, which ... makes no
allowance for such advance notification. Because most litigants would
rather not risk upsetting a judge, advance notification creates a powerful
deterrent to many potential reviewers. It also takes at least a week, and
frequently over a month, for the Financial Disclosure Office to process
requests for review of a financial disclosure form.
Id. According to the CRC, judges' financial disclosure forms are often wanting in
accuracy and completeness. Id. To remedy this state of affairs, the CRC has proposed
eliminating advance notification of requests for disclosure forms, posting recusal lists
in local courthouses, and having judges file two versions of their disclosure formsone for the Financial Disclosure Office and one redacted version (omitting personal
or sensitive information) for public review. Id.
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give rise to an appearance of partiality. Judge A must cease activity
on the case until she eliminates the conflicting interest. If she chooses
not to divest, or if the interest belongs to her spouse or minor child
who does not wish to sell it, Judge A must recuse herself. The above
analysis would apply as well if W Corporation were a named class
representative in a class action pending before Judge A, since class
representatives would be treated as parties.
Judge B, who owns shares in X Corporation, a putative member of
the plaintiff class in a class action pending before her, is disqualified
only if her interest is one that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding. If so, she may avoid disqualification by
divesting of the interest, as long as the circumstances of divestment do
not give rise to an appearance of impartiality under subsection (a),
and as long as she suspends involvement in the case until she has
divested. If her interest in X Corporation is not one that could be
substantially affected by the suit, Judge B is not per se disqualified;
she must still analyze the facts under subsection (a).
An
inconsequential interest would not bar the judge from presiding. The
same analysis would apply if Judge B's spouse or minor child were the
interest-holder.
Judge C, who owns shares in Y Corporation, an absent member of
the certified plaintiff class in a class action pending before her, will
employ exactly the same analysis as Judge B in the above example.
Judge D, who owns shares in Z Corporation which make her a
putative member of a class action pending before her, will evaluate
whether her interest could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the suit. If it could, she has the option of divesting of the shares and
opting out of, or waiving her membership in, the class to avoid
disqualification, provided the circumstances of the divestment and
waiver would not lead an objective observer knowing all the facts to
question her impartiality. It is irrelevant whether Z Corporation is a
named party or absent class member in the suit; Judge D's divestiture
will simultaneously cure the need for recusal on that basis. If Judge
D's interest does not stand to be substantially affected by the outcome
of the proceeding, she is not per se disqualified, but must, however,
analyze the situation under subsection (a). The judge's status as a
putative or absent class member would likely give rise to an
appearance of impartiality and would therefore mandate either
divestment and waiver of class membership or recusal in most cases.
If the interest in Z Corporation were held by Judge D's spouse, thirddegree relative, her spouse's third-degree relative, or the spouse of
such a person, that person could elect to divest and opt out of the class
under the same conditions, eliminating the need for the judge's
recusal.
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CONCLUSION

Class action lawsuits have become nearly ubiquitous in this country,
and the dimensions of these suits have grown as well. This trend has
made it especially important to amend § 455 to create a clearer, more
realistic, and more reasonable framework for dealing with judges'
financial interest conflicts. In light of the often watered-down nature
of the interest of absent or putative class members in a class action
suit, the recusal statute should not treat them as parties, but rather
should assess their financial interest in the outcome of the suit on a
case-by-case basis. The law should not attach undue emotional or
psychological significance to a passive investor's small stock holding in
a particular company. Instead, it should recognize the divestment of a
stock interest as a viable alternative to automatic disqualification in
most cases. Ultimately, the goal of § 455 must be to balance the
competing goals of promoting fair and impartial decision-making
while preventing judge-shopping and keeping a heavily burdened
judicial system running efficiently and economically.
The
amendments proposed in this Note promise to advance that quest.

